

## **NASSP '25 – Abstracts List**

*Please note that these abstracts were submitted earlier in the year; descriptions may not entirely reflect the content as they evolve between submission and the conference!*

### **Panel Descriptions**

#### **Author Meets Critics: Amy Reed-Sandoval's *Intimate Borders: Feminist Migration Ethics***

*Intimate Borders: Feminist Migration Ethics* (OUP, forthcoming in 2025) offers a decolonial, feminist theory of borders that enables us to perceive hidden gender injustices at borders and then take concrete steps to stop them. Grounded in feminist privacy ethics, Chicana feminism, Indigenous philosophies of borders and space, and original ethnographic research conducted by the author at two abortion clinics in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, it challenges political philosophy's public-private divide by urging us to understand borders as intimate. Specifically, it argues that borders are sites of embodied and identity-based harms and that often tamper with the boundaries of our "selves" in ways that impact our personal autonomy. As a feminist theory that questions unhelpful dichotomies, *Intimate Borders* also calls into question popular, all-or-nothing proposals for both "open" and "closed borders," arguing that a feminist approach to borders requires careful exploration of how different borders (including non-Western borders) may both cause and protect against intimate harms of vulnerable groups. *Intimate Borders* unpacks some of the most urgent and under-theorized ethical challenges presented at borders today, including border-crossings for abortion care, the migration of children, pregnancy and miscarriage at borders, family separations at borders, and the complicated relationship between borders and Indigenous identities. *Intimate Borders* is a theoretical framework for feminist migration scholars, policy makers, activists, and anyone else who wishes to raise awareness of gender injustice at the world's borders.

#### **William McBride: World Philosophy and the Nature of the Social**

This session honors the work of Dr. William (Bill) McBride, longtime member and past president of NASSP.

#### **The Philosophy of Non-Exclusion in the Work of Carlos Pereda**

Our panel is on the highly influential social-political philosophy of the Mexican-Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Pereda, whose *Mexico Unveiled: Resisting Colonial Vices and Other Complaints* will be published by Vanderbilt University Press in July 2025. The book is a translation of Pereda's *Pensar a México: Entre Otros Reclamos* (2021)

Pereda's work is especially influential in Latin America, but it is also increasingly influential in the US, as evidenced by sustained engagement by philosophers in the US

and the steadily increasing number of his books and articles that have appeared, or are now appearing, in English. Pereda's U.S.-based interlocutors include philosophers such as José-Antonio Orosco, Gregory Pappas, Carlos Alberto Sánchez, Robert Eli Sanchez, and Manuel Vargas.

Pereda's *Mexico Unveiled* encapsulates a lifetime of reflection on 20th-century Mexican philosophy, and highlights its relevance for current social-political issues. Pereda's work is informed at a deep level by the fact that he was himself a participant in some of the most influential 20th-century debates in Mexican philosophy—he recently celebrated his eightieth birthday. Thus, one of Pereda's central resources as a historian of 20th-century Mexican philosophy is his own lived experience. For this and many other reasons, Pereda is certainly one of the greatest authorities we have today on Mexican philosophy in the 20th century.

In addition to this historical perspective, Pereda also develops an extended systematic discussion of "colonial vices" and "arrogant reason," patterns of thought and action that can hinder progress in all domains, whether philosophical, social-political, or personal, among others. Pereda's overarching philosophical interest is the theory of argumentation; and his focus here is on what he calls "nomadic thinking." His work therefore balances historical engagement with systematic development, in a broadly genealogical approach that aligns with some of the most rewarding philosophical work of our time.

But Pereda's discussion also frequently makes observations outside of philosophy, for instance on Mexican history, literature, and film. In general his writing displays a deep historical understanding and a broad philosophical vision, and these virtues will ensure that his work will continue to engage a wide audience including those interested in politics, nationalism, decolonial theory, argumentation theory, socially engaged epistemology, the complex histories of Mexico and Latin America, and the many ways in which our cultural histories shape our thoughts, habits, and customs.

### **Individual Presentations**

(organized alphabetically by last name)

#### **A**

#### **Roksana Alavi: Racial Passing as Self-Care**

Racial passing causes emotional distress both for the person who is passing for another race and for their families and friends. Historically, passing is addressed in a negative light. Most people do not see a gray area when it comes to passing. They either find it morally questionable, or they don't. I suggest that there is a gray area that passing is not only morally permissible it is perhaps essential for survival. Living under the oppressive (fascist) regimes one becomes adept at concealing one's beliefs and feigning

support for those in charge, and also hide one's identity, all of which could be potentially life-saving coping mechanisms. Navigating life under oppression involves adopting virtues that, under just conditions, would be considered vices. Tessman terms such virtues "burdened virtues," which are virtues that would "normally be quite wrong but that under the extraordinary conditions of oppression are morally recommended" (p. 8). Deception, inauthenticity, and passing serve as examples of burdened virtues, even though the passer has to grapple with the moral weight of constantly lying about one's identity, and the shame stemming from concealing one's true self. This sense of shame, guilt and helplessness burdens the moral agent, even when there is little we can sensibly or wisely do to alter our social circumstances. Tessman (2005) adds that guilt is an appropriate emotional response in situations where we are rendered powerless to effect change. In this paper, utilizing Lisa Tessman's (2005) framework of burdened virtues, I will assert that living inauthentic lives, concealing one's identity, and misleading others about one's demographics, including passing under unjust conditions, are virtues that contribute to our well-being. I will contend that in certain circumstances of oppression, prioritizing one's own well-being (self-care) necessitates the decision, albeit reluctantly, to deceive others regarding our identity and to pass as an identity with which we do not identify. Under such conditions, passing is not only recommended but is advocated as a form of radical self-care. This paper has five sections. The first section provides a brief overview of Tessman's burdened virtues, with a focus on passing as a survival strategy under unjust circumstances. In the second section, I will define self-care and delineate how radical self-care diverges from conventional notions of self-care. The third section presents a case study to exemplify how passing can be viewed as a form of radical self-care. In the fourth section, I will address potential objections, provide rebuttals, and draw conclusions in the final section.

### **Melody Allison: Coalition Through Difference Dussel, Lugones, and the Philosophy of Liberation**

The capitalist colonial project aims to reduce the multiplicity of reality by homogenizing, dividing, and pitting the oppressed against one another. It seeks to make everything interchangeable and exchangeable – to equate people to labor; forests to timber; animals to livestock; land to minerals. It transforms the varied worlds of a pluriverse, full of originality and ingenuity, but also chaos and contradictions into one world, a universe of "civilizing" categories meant to control, settle, and secure the dominant paradigm. Thus, worlds and their diverse inhabitants are violently recast into resources and commodities to be exchanged on the global market. But oppression also breeds resistance, marked by coalition building and communal meaning making. These twin concepts form a continuum: oppressing ← → resisting. The liberatory project is about bringing people together in all of their variedness and difference, to subvert oppression, forge resistance, and create a world in which many worlds can not only fit but flourish. To achieve liberation, we must step outside of this totalizing system and abandon the civilizing categories of oppression and domination. We need a new origin: a new metaphysics from which to build from the ground up and from the outside in. In this

paper, I will focus on Enrique Dussel's metaphysics from the periphery, which lays the foundation for a philosophy of liberation to emerge. I will assess Dussel's concepts of exteriority and proximity as a path to epiphany. I will argue that Dussel's metaphysics serve as a comprehensive foundation from which liberatory coalitions can be built. Next, I will turn to philosopher María Lugones' methodology for coalition building as an epistemological resource for relating to others who are different from ourselves, making space for one another in their otherness. I will discuss Lugones' concepts of loving perception and playfulness, world traveling, and identification. Lastly, I will incorporate what anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro calls "controlled equivocation," to compliment Lugones' methodology by incorporating additional tools for navigating equivocation in lieu of resolution when coalition building.

I will argue that by combining Dussel's metaphysics with Lugones' and de Castro's methodology, we arrive at a liberatory praxis that can rival matrices of imposed categories which define and divide us. Dussel offers the key to confronting the other; to look them in the face in all of their raw vulnerability and exteriority, Lugones shows us how to travel to their world and to see through their eyes. When combined with de Castro's equivocation, we can not only identify and accept the other, but train ourselves to withstand the tension of the unknown inherent to world traveling. In doing so, we are equipped for what Dussel calls epiphany, a pathway to the cosmos beyond totalizing structures.

### **Erik Anderson: Do Male Sexual Assault Victims Suffer Hermeneutical Injustice?**

In *On Being Raped*, Raymond M. Douglas describes being raped by a Catholic priest when he was 18 years old. When he decided to seek the services of a rape crisis center, the all-female staff had difficulty understanding his experience. The only interpretive lens they had was based on female rape victims: "I believe that the staff at the center genuinely meant well" but "they seemed to find it impossible to conceptualize what rape might mean for men without first translating it into categories that were more familiar to them. No body of scholarship or accumulation of practical knowledge existed to guide them as to how male victims typically responded and should be treated" (2016, 58-59).

Douglas acknowledges that he was not much help either, for he also lacked a language in which to comprehend his experience. Researchers who study male victims of rape find that this is not unusual. Given the dominant understandings of masculinity, "male sexual victimhood is nearly incomprehensible because it contradicts cultural ideas of what it means to be a man—strong, powerful, self-sufficient, impenetrable" (Hlavka 2017, 485).

Douglas' story resembles, in some respects, cases of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007). Hermeneutical injustice occurs when members of a marginalized group are

subjected to harmful treatment that they are unable to comprehend because there is a “gap” in the “collective hermeneutical resources.” The concepts necessary for them to understand a harmful experience are lacking because members of their social group have been systematically excluded from contributing to their society’s “meaning-making” resources.

Did Douglas suffer a hermeneutical injustice? On the one hand, Douglas and his counsellors clearly lacked the concepts needed to make sense of his “anomalous” status as a male victim. On the other hand, it is difficult to see men like Douglas—straight, white, cis-gendered, heterosexual, well-educated—as hermeneutically marginalized. Men qua men are not systematically excluded from participating in the creation of society’s hermeneutical resources. The case of male rape victims thus seems to be ambiguous, resembling in some respects cases of hermeneutical injustice, but differing in others.

I will argue that Douglas and other male rape victims do indeed suffer hermeneutical injustice. The challenge is to figure out how this can happen to people who appear to be members of a privileged social group. The solution is to recognize the diversity among men. Some categories of men are systematically excluded from the creation of social meanings, including gay men, trans men, effeminate men, and other men who are associated with women and femininity in the public imagination. Thus, men can suffer from the kind of “structural identity prejudice” that keeps them from being heard. No matter how well they fit the mold of “hegemonic masculinity” prior to being raped, male victims find themselves violently shunted from the category of “real men” (because such men would never allow themselves to be raped) and into the category of “failed” men who lack the credibility and social support needed for their voices and experiences to be taken seriously.

### **Lizi Anderson-Cleary: Reconsidering Participatory Art as Altar and its Role in Memory and Mourning**

As the cases of missing and murdered women at the Mexico-U.S. continue to increase in number and severity, contemporary artists have started to address the topic through activist art. Scholarship in this area either rates the efficacy of or demonstrates how the artist mobilizes the viewer. Considering the horrific cases of gendered violence and femicide (the killing of a woman due to her gender), I wonder, what can art actually do in the face of this crisis? In response, I explore the ways that Mexican artist Elina Chauvet’s performance art piece, *Los Zapatos Rojos* (Red Shoes; 2009-ongoing) speaks in a visual language rooted in the cultural practices of altar-making and ritual. Chauvet first exhibited *Zapatos Rojos* in Ciudad Juárez in 2009 with 33 pairs of shoes, each sourced from the families and friends of the victims of femicide. The shoes were painted red, and then positioned along Calle Benito Juárez, which leads directly to the border crossing into Texas. The effect is a defiant, tragic, and ghostly march of red shoes. Chauvet exhibits *Zapatos Rojos* globally, each time asking the community to

donate and paint the shoes. In recent iterations, members have begun to write messages that are placed in the shoes or underneath them. Art historian Angelique Szymanek connects the writing of these messages to Laura Pérez's understanding of all Chicana artworks as *ofrendas*, or sacrificial offerings.

If we consider *Zapatos Rojos* as a ritual process and its installation an altar, we can connect the artwork to forms of visual culture such as *descansos* (roadside memorials), and memorials for the victims of femicide, like *Voces Sin Eco's* Cross Campaign. Through this comparison, we can apply Mariana Ortega's analysis of roadside *descansos* in her recent book, *Carnalities*. She observes that they create a sacred space through the intersection of the spiritual and the material. These memorials mark, in Gloria Anzaldúa's words, a "liminal, "in-between" and "borderland" space. Ortega notes that these memorials become sites of memory and mourning for both the living and the deceased. Ortega then discusses María del Rosario Acosta López's concept of the fragility of memory, in which art cannot provide explanations or solutions for injustices but are rather spontaneous spaces for memory and forgetting. I expand Ortega and Acosta López's arguments here to emphasize the centrality of the communal and collective aspects of these memorials, and by extension, *Zapatos Rojos*. Chauvet's artwork is a practice of ritual and altar-creation that is rooted in the community and mobilized for the community. Through this analysis, I suggest a new framework for the way that scholarship engages with activist art. We should focus on the ways that art works with and for the community, how it employs the visual languages of that community, and the ways that it marshals modes of healing and comfort that other forms of activism may be unable to reach. There is a place for art in activism, but the ways that it will fill this role are still up for debate.

### **Corwin Aragon: The Personal and the Political Are Structural**

The "problem" of Latin American immigration is one of a number of recurring and seemingly-intractable political issues in the United States. While the debate on how to resolve this "problem" has taken one of its more extreme turns in the current U.S. Presidential administration, this debate is not new. Just how much or how little the U.S. owes Latin American immigrants has been a source of political contention for quite some time. The varied positions in this debate typically answer this question by taking up a stance on how restrictive our policies of entry can be, giving special attention to how best to protect and secure our (southern) border. A parallel fixation on borders is found in philosophical debates about the ethics of immigration: much of the philosophical literature on immigration takes whether or not states have a right to exclude immigrants as its central question. This question shapes the philosophical terrain as primarily a debate among rival arguments for either closed or open borders, mapping the terrain as exhaustively covered by these two diametrically-opposed positions.

But the preoccupation with the moral status of borders obfuscates the U.S.'s role in shaping the conditions under which Latin American migrants make the decision to leave behind their home state in the first place. By framing the immigration "problem" as primarily about what "we" are or are not morally licensed to do to keep "them" out, the popular and philosophical debates preclude examination of U.S. citizens' role in perpetuating U.S.-imposed structural injustices that push Latin Americans to migrate. By ignoring the many ways in which the U.S. has shaped the social situations that lead Latin Americans to migrate, these discourses are unable to adequately address U.S. citizens' responsibilities to Latin American immigrants.

In this paper, I argue that U.S. citizens bear what I call structural responsibility to remedy the injustices we impose on Latin American countries. I develop this argument in four sections. First, I argue that the closed versus open borders debate, by obscuring or outright ignoring morally-salient features of the existing relationships between U.S. citizens and Latin American immigrants, is doomed to provide an inadequate account of the responsibilities of the former to the latter. Second, in response to this inadequacy, I argue that we should understand much Latin American immigration into the United States as a result of structural injustices that we, U.S. citizens, have imposed on Latin American countries. Third, I argue that U.S. citizens' participation in structural practices that cause injustice make us complicit in their wrongs, and our complicity in the specific injustices imposed on Latin American countries generates weighty moral responsibilities to remedy the injustices that cause migration from those countries. Finally, I close the paper by suggesting ways that U.S. citizens might work to meet the responsibilities we bear because of our complicity in injustice.

**María Claudia Navarro Araujo: Epistemología de lo sagrado y la descolonialidad del saber. Un análisis filosófico sobre la subalternidad de los saberes herbolarios de las *tlamatinih siua mexicana* del posclásico tardío (Epistemology of the Sacred and the Decoloniality of Knowledge: A Philosophical Analysis of the Subalternity of the Herbal Knowledge of the Late Postclassic Mexica *Tlamatinih Siua*)**

La presente investigación se sitúa en la intersección crítica de tres aristas que aún hoy día se encuentran atravesando nuestra realidad y que a su vez son correlativas a los tres elementos que componen el título de la investigación: La subalternidad de los saberes herbolarios (Colonialidad del Saber) de las *tlamatinih siua mexicana* (Colonialidad de Género) del posclásico tardío (Colonialidad del Ser). Inspirada en la propuesta metodológica de Montserrat Ríos Reyes sobre Filosofía Mexicana y su análisis de la mexicanidad como circunstancia histórica a través de una analogía con el tejido (trama y urdimbre), pretendo revisar los principios desde los cuales la cosmovisión mexica (del posclásico tardío y siendo particularmente crítica con las fuentes de consulta) genera conocimiento, entiende la realidad y fundamenta las maneras de proceder en ella. El interés filosófico reside propiamente en los componentes empírico y

mágico-religioso que convergen en los conocimientos relativos a la herbolaria, tomando en consideración la ritualidad inherente a la práctica como un elemento clave de su particularidad epistémica. De esta forma es que la presento como expresión de una dinámica en el ejercicio del conocimiento radicalmente opuesta a la que se propugna en el discurso de la modernidad. Y atendiendo a la que parece ser una imposibilidad teórica para abordar procesos histórico-culturales que difieren de los postulados onto-epistémicos occidentales, la reflexión gira en torno a cómo es que la lógica occidental, binaria y jerárquica, que impregnó también el proyecto civilizatorio español y además embiste el canon filosófico, articula esta distancia y marginalización no solo del núcleo epistemológico mexica y sus saberes (entre otros), sino también de las subjetividades que los albergan.

#### English translation:

This research is situated at the critical intersection of three dimensions that still traverse our present reality, and which correspond to the three elements that make up the title of the study: the subalternity of herbal knowledge (*Coloniality of Knowledge*) of the *tlamatinih siua mexica* (*Coloniality of Gender*) of the Late Postclassic period (*Coloniality of Being*). Inspired by Montserrat Ríos Reyes's methodological proposal on Mexican Philosophy and her analysis of *mexicanidad* (Mexicanness) as a historical circumstance through an analogy with weaving (warp and weft), I aim to examine the principles from which the Mexica worldview (of the Late Postclassic period, with a particularly critical approach to the sources consulted) generates knowledge, understands reality, and grounds ways of acting within it. The philosophical interest lies precisely in the empirical and magical-religious components that converge in the knowledge related to herbalism, taking into account the inherent rituality of the practice as a key element of its particular epistemic nature. In this way, I present it as an expression of a mode of engaging with knowledge that is radically opposed to that proposed by the discourse of modernity. Given what appears to be a theoretical impossibility of approaching historical-cultural processes that differ from Western onto-epistemological assumptions, this reflection revolves around how the Western, binary, and hierarchical logic—embedded in the Spanish civilizing project and present in the philosophical canon—constructs the distance and marginalization not only of the Mexica epistemological core and its forms of knowledge (among others), but also of the subjectivities that embody them.

## **B**

### **Michael Ball-Blakely: Beyond Discrimination: On the Wrongs of Immigration Control**

While there is marked disagreement on what immigration justice entails, a common view holds that discriminatory immigration policies are unjust. Even if states have a right to restrict entry, they ought not do so based on membership in protected classes.

For example, just as racial discrimination is unjust within the state, so too is it unjust when used to determine admission into the state. Some theorists hold that this is true whether such policies are directly discriminatory, i.e., explicitly selecting based on membership in protected groups, or indirectly discriminatory, i.e., using facially neutral categories as a proxy for selecting against members of protected groups. Focusing on Désirée Lim's recent work, I offer several reasons why non-discrimination approaches to immigration justice will fail to be fully satisfying.

First, proponents of such views face a dilemma. Using a harm-independent account of the wrong of discrimination, they can show that discriminatory immigration policies are wrongful but not that they (generally speaking) rise to the level of rights-violations. Or using a harm-dependent view, they can show that they rise to the level of a rights-violation but must recognize that exclusionary policies rarely qualify. Lim, for example, uses a harm-dependent approach, arguing that discriminatory immigration policies—including skill-selection—undermine our ability to form and revise conceptions of the good. However, it is doubtful that the immigration policies of other states have such an impact on our self-conception, especially when they take the form of indirect discrimination.

Second, the expressive content of indirectly discriminatory immigration policies is unclear. There is no single set of shared meanings through which we can understand them. Accordingly, we must determine whether the cultural context that matters is the global society as a whole, the receiving country, or the sending country. And importantly, unless we're focused on meanings within the sending country, it is far less clear that harm-dependent accounts will be useful.

Third, when criticism is focused on discrimination, we not only avoid analyzing the most significant harms, but fail to offer a general criticism of immigration control. This allows politicians to pursue alternative strategies. Such a view would be unable to explain why the wrong done to low-skill would-be immigrants is not significantly lessened by fully closed borders. Or, by contrast, politicians could avoid discriminatory language, refrain from inculcating racist or classist attitudes in voters, and thus feasibly avoid harmful discrimination. And it is unclear that the likely alternative to skill-selection—temporary admission as a highly exploited and often denigrated worker—would be better for the self-conceptions of low-skill immigrants.

Therefore, if we wish to condemn immigration control we will need to focus elsewhere. None of this indicates skepticism regarding the wrong of discrimination, nor of the usefulness of the language of non-discrimination in other spheres, particularly within the state. Instead, this is meant to serve as a call to focus on (i) the material harms of the current regime of border control or (ii) the effects of discriminatory policies on members of the receiving state.

## **Joel Peña Bañuelos: La memoria como filosofía practica en el norte de mexico (Memory as Practical Philosophy in Northern Mexico)**

La investigación habla sobre la importancia de la memoria en el pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano visto desde la Filosofía de la Liberación y sobre si existe una filosofía en el Norte de México, específicamente en Cd. Juárez. Las preguntas de investigación que se busca responder son las siguientes: ¿de qué hablamos cuando pensamos en la Filosofía de la Liberación? ¿qué importancia tiene el rescate del pasado para el pensamiento del Norte de México? ¿de qué manera se manifiesta el pasado en el presente? La memoria juega un rol muy importante en la búsqueda y justificación de una filosofía latinoamericana. Si bien el arte y la literatura son manifestaciones de pensamiento crítico estos se valen de la memoria para reflejar los valores y preocupaciones de un colectivo sin caer en la ideología y, en este sentido, la memoria es un saber problematizado. Porque no basta con un modelo explicativo filosófico o histórico, sino, que hace falta recorrer las experiencias compartidas de las sociedades en el pasado remoto e inmediato. Además, debemos cuestionarnos más a fondo ¿qué papel juega la memoria como acto de liberación? ¿de qué manera la memoria es una argumentación crítica del pasado en el arte? Y finalmente, ¿existe una filosofía en el Norte de México?

### English translation:

This research explores the importance of memory in Latin American philosophical thought as seen through the lens of the Philosophy of Liberation, and questions whether a philosophy exists in northern Mexico, specifically in Ciudad Juárez. The research seeks to answer the following questions: What do we mean when we talk about the Philosophy of Liberation? What importance does recovering the past hold for thought in northern Mexico? In what ways does the past manifest in the present? Memory plays a crucial role in the search for and justification of a Latin American philosophy. While art and literature are expressions of critical thought, they rely on memory to reflect the values and concerns of a collective without falling into ideology; in this sense, memory becomes a problematized form of knowledge. It is not enough to have a philosophical or historical explanatory model—what is also needed is to trace the shared experiences of societies in both the distant and recent past. Furthermore, we must ask more deeply: What role does memory play as an act of liberation? In what way is memory a critical argument about the past in art? And finally, does a philosophy exist in northern Mexico?

## **Roberto Sanchez Benitez: Jorge Portilla y "La Nausea" de J. P. Sartre (Jorge Portilla and *La Nausee* by J.P. Sartre)**

Entre 1948 y 1952 existió un grupo de existencialistas mexicanos, llamado Hiperión, animado por Samuel Ramos y José Gaos. La importancia de este grupo fue determinante para continuar difundiendo corrientes filosóficas como el neokantismo,

la filosofía de los valores, la fenomenología (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) y, particularmente, el existencialismo (Sartre, Camus), las cuales fueron utilizadas para comprender la circunstancia mexicana. Los integrantes del grupo se inscribieron en un movimiento autorreflexivo que el periodo posrevolucionario mexicano invitó a conformar. Particularmente, habremos de analizar la influencia de Sartre en Jorge Portilla, integrante del grupo, quien hizo de los conceptos de contingencia y libertad, una constante en sus análisis. Portilla puso en alta estima ideas sartreanas como "comunidad real", capaz de actuar en el mundo y transformarlo, así como destacó la constante apelación a la sociedad y el carácter estrictamente moral de la filosofía del pensador francés. Las tareas de autoconocimiento y autocomprensión habrán de ser consideradas como un paso más en la liberación. Para Sartre la realidad humana es libre, dado que no es suficientemente sino que está perpetuamente arrancada de sí misma, en la medida en que lo que ella ha sido se encuentra separado por la nada de lo que es y de lo que será. Existencia imperfecta que no tiene memoria. El hombre es libre porque no es sí mismo, sino presencia de sí. De ahí la necesidad de "hacernos", hasta el mínimo detalle, y con ello de "elegirnos": "La libertad será precisamente la nada que es sida en el meollo del hombre y que obliga a la realidad-humana a hacerse en vez de ser". Portilla destacó el sentido de gratuidad absoluta del hombre en el mundo, planteado por la filosofía sartreana, así como el nuevo humanismo promovido por la misma.

#### English translation:

Between 1948 and 1952, there existed a group of Mexican existentialists called *Hiperión*, led by Samuel Ramos and José Gaos. This group played a crucial role in continuing the dissemination of philosophical currents such as Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of values, phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), and particularly existentialism (Sartre, Camus), which were used to understand the Mexican circumstance. The members of the group took part in a self-reflective movement encouraged by the post-revolutionary Mexican period.

This study specifically analyzes the influence of Sartre on Jorge Portilla, a member of the group, who made the concepts of contingency and freedom central to his analyses. Portilla held in high regard Sartrean ideas such as the "real community," capable of acting in and transforming the world. He also emphasized the constant appeal to society and the strictly moral character of Sartre's philosophy. The tasks of self-knowledge and self-understanding are to be considered steps toward liberation. For Sartre, human reality is free because it is not fully itself; it is perpetually torn from itself, insofar as what it has been is separated by nothingness from what it is and what it will be. It is an imperfect existence without memory. Man is free because he is not his own being, but rather the presence of himself. Hence the necessity to "make ourselves," down to the smallest detail, and in doing so, to "choose ourselves": "Freedom will be precisely the nothingness that lies at the core of man and compels human reality to make itself instead of simply being." Portilla emphasized the sense of

absolute gratuity of human existence in the world proposed by Sartrean philosophy, as well as the new humanism it promoted.

### **Kas Bernays: Where are the Displaced in the Philosophy of Poverty?**

Descriptive accounts of the nature of poverty have so far entirely neglected to consider the poverty of forcibly displaced people. I motivate the claim most refugees are impoverished, against the claim that refugees are in an 'interstitial' situation to which the concept of poverty cannot be applied. I argue that the sheer duration of most experiences of forcible displacement - for instance, the lengths of time spent in refugee camps - gives us reason to believe that refugees are not between contexts, but rather that their situation as refugees is their context. I further suggest that - especially given the recent and projected-future growth of the global refugee population - refugees cannot be treated as marginal cases, but rather their case demands a descriptive account of poverty which can accommodate their specific circumstances. I suggest refugee cases pose challenges for two influential views of what poverty is: Townsend's relative deprivation of basic wellbeing account, and Sen's capability account. I interpret both as holding that the poverty-threshold varies relative to a person's society - such that each society will set a different threshold for when one is considered to be in poverty. Hence, both struggle to capture refugees' poverty, since it is challenging to ascribe any particular society to them. I argue they do not comfortably accommodate refugee poverty because, for the purpose of identifying whether a refugee counts as being in poverty, they must consider their situation relative to (1) The 'home' society they were displaced from (2) the society of the territory they presently inhabit. (3) the society of the camp itself. As I will show, each option produces strain for Townsend and Sen's accounts, such that none offers an obvious or comfortable basis for judging whether a displaced person is in poverty. While I entertain the possibility of resolving this by relativizing Townsend or Sen's views to a global society instead, I object that there does not seem to be enough international integration, at present, for a coherent account of poverty to arise from such an adaptation of these views. I conclude refugee poverty may be better explained through an agency-deprivation account of the kind proposed by Jennifer Morton. This captures the ways refugee poverty manifests not just in deprivation of material resources, but also in the agency-impoverishing apparatus of contemporary camps, bureaucratic systems, and controls on movement and work. In this, I draw from my observations during two months in 2024 spent working with people living in the 'Closed Controlled Access Centre' in Samos, Greece. The agency-deprivation view of poverty thus reveals that addressing refugee poverty means not just aid, but also dismantling the coercive structures that constrain the possibilities of refugees maintaining and exercising agency. I conclude that the philosophy of poverty cannot continue to root itself in the tacit assumption of poverty as a 'domestic' phenomenon, confined within enclosed societies. Rather, a descriptive account of poverty must be fit for a world which is increasingly on the move.

## **Gabrielle Bussell: SWERFs, Prudes, and “Carceral Feminists”: A Critical Examination of the Rhetoric Used Against Sex Trade Abolitionists**

Debates surrounding the topic of sex work have recently resurfaced in philosophical journals, popular media, and online. Among other things, those in favor of retaining or expanding the trade argue that sex work ought to be understood as a source of empowerment and an expression of bodily self-determination. Sex trade abolitionists, however, argue that sex work should be understood as a source of objectification, exploitation, and oppression along gender and class lines. Feminists on both sides of the debate seem to agree that sex workers are a marginalized group of people via their status as sex workers, however, the source of this marginalization and its remedies prove to be a point of departure between them. While much of the contemporary debate focuses on which legal policy best suits the goals of either camp, my project aims to examine the underlying assumptions made by those in favor of retaining the sex trade and whether the charges made against sex trade abolitionists based on these assumptions are sustainable.

In this paper, I will examine three claims that are often made against sex trade abolitionists and show why they are untenable when held up to scrutiny. The first claim says that critiquing the sex trade necessarily entails a moral condemnation of sex workers. I will argue that this is a false equivalency, especially given that we often critique other trades (such as the fossil fuel industry and coltan mining) without condemning the workers in said trade. Additionally, as Esperanza Fonseca points out, this conflation of the worker with the industry is a tactic that is often used by companies to protect their own interests (Fonseca 2020, 26). Thus, we can understand this rhetoric as oriented toward protecting those who benefit from the trade most (pimps and johns) rather than the workers themselves.

The second claim says that abolitionists express exclusionary attitudes towards sex workers (for example, they are often described as “SWERFs”—sex worker exclusionary radical feminists). I will show how the term “SWERF” is often tied to the term “TERF” (trans exclusionary radical feminist) but that this comparison ultimately does not hold. This is because, while TERFs do indeed exclude trans women from their concept “woman” and, thus, their feminist theorizing, sex trade abolitionists do not exclude sex workers from their analysis. Indeed, abolitionists often center sex workers in their analysis of feminist issues rather than exclude them.

Finally, those in favor of the sex trade often claim that the abolitionist stance necessarily entails “carceral” solutions to abolishing the trade. I will show that, while it might be true that some abolitionists favor carceral solutions (like the Nordic Model), a Marxist feminist account need not rely on legalistic frameworks to defend sex trade abolition. Additionally, I will offer an alternative framework, the “Bodies Back Model” by AF3IRM, which advocates for decriminalization alongside education, ending social

stigma towards sex workers, economic self-sufficiency, and non-state solutions to addressing the harms of sex work (AF3IRM Hawai'i 2020).

## C

### **Leonardo Caffo: Anarchy as a Tool for Resolving the Contemporary Migration Crisis: Rethinking Boundaries through the Concept of "Barbarian Geographies"**

Anarchy, as a political theory, provides a compelling framework for addressing the contemporary migration crisis, especially through the lens of Toni Negri's analysis in *Empire*. Migration, in this context, is not simply population movement, but a challenge to traditional nation-state structures. Negri and Hardt argue that global imperialist forces have eroded national boundaries, and migration further accelerates the dissolution of state-centric politics. Migrants, often termed "new barbarians," destabilize fixed geopolitical and social boundaries. Their movement blurs traditional ideas of citizenship, challenging the rigid state structure.

The notion of "new barbarians" refers to invaders who disrupt and destabilize the ancient constructs of statehood. However, Negri emphasizes that these "barbarians" are not external, but emerge within the global system, overturning distinctions of state sovereignty. This metaphor underscores that migration, as an ongoing flow, destroys nation-state classifications, prompting the need for new political formations. Migrants, by crossing borders, redefine sovereignty and reveal the fluidity of contemporary geopolitics.

The "liquid theory of borders" suggests that instead of viewing borders as fixed, we should see them as part of a geography that is inherently unstable, shifting, and fluid. The idea of "barbarian geographies" challenges the traditional concept of inside and outside spaces, proposing a world where distinctions between the included and excluded are constantly questioned. Lampedusa, a focal point of the migration crisis, symbolizes this instability: the boundary between Europe and Africa becomes fluid, and the migrant's status is not fixed but perpetually in transit. In this scenario, migrants are not mere "intruders" but transformative agents, challenging the essence of national territoriality.

Agamben's concept of the "state of exception" is crucial in understanding the migrant's condition as "bare life," living outside traditional legal categories. In Agamben's view, the migrant is excluded from state protection, existing in a zone of exception. This state highlights the potential to rethink geography beyond state boundaries. The vision of a borderless geography, where people move freely, evokes an anarchic political order, one where authority is not imposed from above but created collectively in a shared space.

Anarchy, in this context, offers a solution to the migration crisis by rejecting rigid state borders and advocating for cooperative, inclusive societies. As a political theory opposing all forms of domination and authoritarianism, anarchy reimagines migration not as a threat, but as an opportunity to create a new geopolitical order. In this vision, migrants are not outsiders but contributors to a more fluid, inclusive, and free world. Thus, anarchist thought presents a radical departure from state-centric solutions, proposing a world without borders.

This anarchic vision recognizes the transformative power of migration, seeing it as a challenge to the fixed boundaries of nation-states and an opportunity for a more inclusive, fluid global order. By rejecting the traditional politics of exclusion, anarchy suggests a reconfiguration of the global system, where movement across borders is not a threat but a means of fostering collective existence.

**Graciela Solórzano Castillo: La práctica estética en la comunidad cuir fronteriza: reflexiones sobre la aesthesis, la poiésis y la valorización del arte (Aesthetic Practice in the Borderland Queer Community: Reflections on Aesthesis, Poiésis, and the Valuation of Art)**

La estética, como rama de la filosofía, tiene como objetivo reflexionar sobre la belleza. Pero como en toda reflexión filosófica, nos enfrentamos a la pregunta sobre qué es aquello que estudiamos, al menos desde una forma profunda. Entonces, nos proponemos, como punto de partida, definir ¿qué es la belleza? Al hacernos esta pregunta, sabemos que los valores que han pervivido en la historia de la humanidad, o de la que tenemos registro y de la que ha ocupado nuestra atención, se presentan como un obstáculo: ¿podemos acaso librarnos de la contingencia para llegar a una definición esencial de nuestro concepto? Puede ser que sí. Ese fue uno de los intentos que realizó Georg Simmel con su texto de Filosofía del Dinero, una comprensión profunda de la imposición de valores en relación con el intercambio.

En este trabajo se pretende realizar algo parecido, reflexionar sobre la estética desde tres horizontes: la contemplación, la creación y la valorización, tomando como punto de referencia y comprobación un fenómeno particular: su relación con sujetos cuir de nuestro siglo.

Las preguntas que se buscan contestar son las siguientes: ¿cuál es la relación entre la identidad del sujeto cuir desde parámetros como la corporalidad y el deseo y su relación con la práctica estética? ¿Se puede decir que desde esta contingencia se establece una experiencia de reconocimiento a través del acto estético que traspasa a una condición de la experiencia humana? ¿Cómo reconoce el sujeto cuir ello dentro de una poética? Y finalmente, ¿se puede establecer la unidad entre el fenómeno estético como acto contemplativo, acto creador, objeto creado y acto valorativo usando el arte cuir de frontera?

Se pretende abordar de forma esbozada estos planteamientos, en principio, puesto que implica un largo trabajo de investigación responder estas preguntas de manera suficiente y satisfactoria. Pero es necesario antes crear algunos bosquejos que nos orienten. Ese es el objetivo de este primer texto. Para ello, me apoyaré de los trabajos teóricos de filósofos como el antes mencionado Georg Simmel, Enrique Dussel a través de su filosofía de la liberación, específicamente su estética y Hans Gadamer. Los ejemplos de la comunidad cuir se dan en tres casos concretos que se dieron desde la casa Cx16, espacio fundado por la investigadora y artista Marcia Santos y el colectivo Somos Una Vergüenza para Toda La Sociedad, fundado por los gestores culturales Olga Sáenz y Tomás Flores impartido en Azul Arena, en Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.

### English translation:

Aesthetics, as a branch of philosophy, aims to reflect on beauty. But as with any philosophical inquiry, we are confronted with the question of what exactly we are studying—at least in a deeper sense. Thus, as a starting point, we propose to define: what is beauty? In asking this question, we recognize that the values that have endured throughout human history—or at least those we have recorded and focused on—present an obstacle: can we ever free ourselves from contingency in order to arrive at an essential definition of the concept? Perhaps we can. This was one of Georg Simmel's attempts in *The Philosophy of Money*, where he explored how value is imposed in relation to exchange.

This work aims to carry out a similar reflection on aesthetics from three perspectives: contemplation, creation, and valuation—using as a reference and test case a specific phenomenon: its relationship with queer subjects in our current century.

The guiding questions are as follows: What is the relationship between the identity of the queer subject—defined through parameters such as corporeality and desire—and their engagement with aesthetic practice? Can it be said that, through this contingency, a form of recognition is established via the aesthetic act, one that transcends into a broader condition of human experience? How does the queer subject recognize this within a poetics? And finally, can unity be established between the aesthetic phenomenon as contemplative act, creative act, created object, and evaluative act, using borderland queer art?

This paper aims to outline initial responses to these questions, recognizing that a full and satisfactory treatment would require a much more extensive investigation. Still, it is necessary to sketch some initial orientations—and that is the goal of this first text. To do so, I will draw upon the theoretical work of philosophers such as the aforementioned Georg Simmel, Enrique Dussel (especially his aesthetic theory within the Philosophy of Liberation), and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The queer community examples are drawn from three specific cases developed at Casa Cx16, a space founded by researcher and artist Marcia Santos, and from the collective *Somos Una Vergüenza para Toda la Sociedad*,

founded by cultural organizers Olga Sáenz and Tomás Flores, in workshops held at Azul Arena in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.

### **Chong Choe-Smith: Executive Power, Deportations, and Immigrant Rights**

In this paper, I argue that while the President, in law and practice, enjoys wide discretion in enforcing immigration law, there are limits to this discretion based on the rights of immigrants, including naturalized citizens and undocumented migrants. In the United States, we have experienced one upheaval after another with changes in administration and heavy reliance on executive orders, most recently from the Trump to Biden administrations and then again with the Biden to Trump administrations. This paper focuses on the current administration's executive orders related to mass deportations and the impact of these orders on various immigrant communities regardless of their legal status. This paper reviews Julian Davis Mortenson's (2019) theories of interpreting the President's Article II powers and agrees that Article II authorizes executive power and not royal prerogative. Moreover, if we take rights seriously, any exercise of executive power is constrained by the rights guaranteed by the Constitution including the due process rights of immigrants. It is these rights that place moral, if not legal, limits on the President's power to execute the law.

This paper is divided into four parts. In part 1, I rely on Mortenson's descriptions of the three possible ways to interpret the President's Article II powers and offer a very brief review of the literature on the use of executive orders. In part 2, focusing on immigration law, I describe the President's broad powers on immigration law and the practice of judicial deference. In part 3, I argue that if we take rights seriously, these rights place limitations on the exercise of the President's powers on immigration law, including the power to issue executive orders. In part 4, I consider possible objections, including the objection that undocumented migrants are outside of the scope of those who enjoy rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and outline my responses.

### **D**

### **Ivory Day: The Intersubjective and Culturally Contextualized Phenomenology of Jorge Portilla**

The proposed presentation examines Jorge Portilla's *Fenomenología del Relajo* with additional observations drawn from his essay "Comunidad, Grandeza, y Miseria del Mexicano". The aim of this study is twofold. The first aim is to analyze Portilla's adaptation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of meaning (*sens*) as behavior in his phenomenology, that is, as acts of subjectivity in objectivity that structure existence within a certain atmosphere. This analysis will clarify 1) how Portilla draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as a foundational framework 2) how Portilla modifies Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological framework by making intersubjectivity the fundamental domain of human existence 3) how Portilla incorporates his notion of value as an

essential part of meaning (*sens*) within intersubjective acts. The goal of this first analysis is to demonstrate that, while Merleau-Ponty already emphasizes that perception and meaning (*sens*) arise within embodied experience and are inherently intersubjective, Portilla pushes this further by making the constitution of human existence as acts ontologically dependent on intersubjectivity, wherein value emerges dynamically through concrete acts that are inherently intersubjective.

The second aim of this study is to demonstrate how Portilla both employed and modified Merleau-Ponty's notion of meaning (*sens*) and his wider phenomenology to develop a phenomenological framework that accounts for cultural particularities, specifically Mexican linguistic phenomena.

The significance of this paper lies in demonstrating how Portilla's phenomenology contributes to the Merleau-Pontyan tradition in two key ways. First, it presents a novel application of phenomenology by extending Merleau-Ponty's concept of meaning (*sens*) to a more thoroughly intersubjective framework in which value is constituted through relational acts. Second, it provides a phenomenologically significant way to account for phenomena particular to a culture's language within this approach. In a word, Portilla offers a situated phenomenological account of language—one that not only draws from Merleau-Ponty's insights but also actively integrates language into phenomenological analysis, proposing a context-sensitive approach to studying language through phenomenological methods.

The presentation will proceed as follows. First, I examine Merleau-Ponty's notion of being as an act of behavior and meaning's essential role in this fundamental behaviour.

Second, I analyze Portilla's appropriation of this concept, showing how he extends Merleau-Ponty's account of meaning (*sens*) by introducing the notion of value as an essential component of intersubjectivity. I argue that, for Portilla, intersubjectivity is the fundamental domain in which subjectivity is constituted in objectivity, and that value is essential to all meaning.

Third, I explore how Portilla applies this framework to specifically Mexican linguistic practices. By grounding his phenomenology in Mexican linguistic expressions, Portilla extends Merleau-Ponty's insights by demonstrating how meaning, as subjectivity making itself within objectivity, is shaped, first and foremost, by communal contexts.

Finally, I consider the broader implications of Portilla's work for phenomenology and the philosophy of language. I argue that his engagement with Mexican linguistic phenomena offers a model for integrating phenomenology with the philosophy of language in a way that accounts for cultural specificity while remaining grounded in fundamental ontological structures.

**E**

## **Barrett Emerick: Redemption in an Unjust World**

Although the concept of redemption has received a lot of attention in theology and religious studies, it has received very little attention in philosophy. In a longer project I aim to begin to fill that gap, exploring and analyzing the concept through a secular/non-religious lens and working to make sense of it in various areas of life, both moral and non-moral.

On my view, someone achieves redemption when they make good on their potential and make up, in some significant way, for some past failure, either moral or non-moral.

There are two important elements to this definition. The first is that someone has latent potential that can be actualized (think about redeeming a gift certificate). The second is that someone can respond to and move forward from some way that they have failed to live up to that potential in the past.

Crucially, such failures can either be moral failures (as when one person wrongs another) or non-moral failures, as when someone underperforms at a skill, makes a bad judgement call that requires correction, or has a chapter in their life from which they want to move on, by addressing that chapter and answering questions that are left open or resolving issues that require attention.

In this paper, I focus in particular on how that general account of redemption can play out within unjust circumstances. My aim is to make sense of what it would mean for someone raised within misogynistic, white-supremacist ideologies to redeem themselves, focusing on making up for both past actions and attitudes that they now condemn. In doing so I make use of Quill Kukla's account of 'retraction' and show how it plays an important role in redemption, along with more traditional elements of moral repair.

Throughout the project I rely on a narrative account of the self, drawing on work by Susan Brison, Hilde Lindemann, Galen Strawson, and Marya Schechtman. I contend that redemption is most at home when framed in narrative terms. However, that framing also invites discussion of the ways that redemption – and redemption arcs – can go awry and end up reinscribing oppressive ideologies by way of what Anna Gotlib and trends on social media call "main character energy."

Redemption under unjust circumstances, I argue, involves both retraction, repair, and humility. Someone who is aiming at redemption ought to be careful to avoid embodying "main character energy" and simultaneously balance, on one hand, a narrative account of the self that tends to encourage understanding yourself as being the protagonist in your life's story, while on the other hand, not making it about you as you work to reckon with what it means to have been raised within oppressive ideologies.

## **Jeshua Evans: Family and the State in Ancient Materialism**

In the US, right-wing political attacks on education and academic freedom have centered on 'family values' and state interests. Their rhetoric often appeals to parent choice, and crackdowns on campus activism are justified by an appeal to US foreign policy interests. While it's been traditional to note Epicureanism as a school disinterested in politics, I argue that its break with the various Socratic schools (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism) on the priority of the family, the state, and piety has application to current issues. I emphasize two principle inversions of Socratic thought on which Epicurus' radical conclusions rely. First is the subordination of theory to practice, a consequence of his prudence-based ethics. The second, partially informed by the first, is the endeavor to critique, rather than justify, existing norms by revealing the contingency of their origins. In combination, both of these principles led Epicureans to critique the traditionally central obligations to family and the state as, at best, contingent formations. In their place, Epicureanism substitutes friendship and education as the principle goods. In a modern context, I argue first that the premises of Epicurus' anti-political sentiments are no longer tenable, and that an updated materialist ethics based on prudence entails a political struggle for a world free of injustice where a tranquil life is possible and good, including friendship and education, is easily obtained. My second suggestion is that an Epicurean, rather than a Socratic, framework is better suited for a critique against the right-wing attack on education.

## **James Ewing: Finding a Middle Road for Social Reasons**

There is much emerging literature on the normativity of social norms (see Richardson 2024, Witt 2023, Sadovsky 2022, Kaplan 2021, 2023, Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Sontuoso 2023). Of those who accept the idea that social norms are genuinely normative, or that there are reasons to act in accordance with social norms, there are two important lines of thought which can be roughly aligned along Humean and Kantian lines (cf. Witt 2023). The Humean line of thought seeks to explain reasons to act in accordance with social norms by appealing to the attitudes and beliefs of individuals or groups in a community (Richardson 2024, Kaplan 2021, 2023, Bicchieri 2005, 2017, Hart 1961, and see Street 2010, 2012). The Kantian line of thought seeks to explain reasons to act in accordance with social norms by appealing to the respect they show (Sadovsky 2022, Stohr 2012, Buss 1999, Rawls 1955).

In this paper, I show how both accounts are lacking in some crucial respect. The Humean account, I argue, does not abstract far enough beyond the perspectives or psychologies of particular agents or groups. For this reason, it cannot explain the normative force behind reasons to act in accordance with social norms. The Kantian account, I argue, abstracts too far beyond the perspectives or psychologies of particular agents or groups, all the way to rationality simpliciter. For this reason, it has difficulties explaining the differences between the reasons to act in accordance with different

social norms in different communities. Additionally, it must explain such reasons in terms of the respect they show, which I argue is undesirable.

My preferred approach takes the community itself (and the particular practical identity it has) as a source of normativity. In this way, my approach should be seen as a middle road between the Humean and Kantian accounts, for community lies somewhere between the psychology of particular agents/groups and rational agency simpliciter. Drawing on the work of Christine Korsgaard (1994, 2009), I give a constitutive account of the normativity of social norms under which members of a community have a reason to act in accordance with that community's social norms because doing so contributes to practices which are constitutive of their communities.

**F**

### **Philipa Friedman: Idiosyncratic Political Behavior at the Limits of the Party System**

This paper investigates a phenomenon I call "idiosyncratic political behavior". I take this phenomenon to incorporate political behavior like voting for different political parties in different elections, voting "against one's interests", supporting policies contradictory to one's party affiliation, and electoral abstention. I focus on electoral politics specifically, although idiosyncratic political behavior might occur in other modes of political engagement.

Pundits, critics, and epistocrats often ascribe idiosyncratic political behavior to political ignorance, but I worry that this explanation obfuscates a broader structural problem with the configuration of our representative institutions. People seek out political engagement to express moral beliefs and to further their material interests (including oft-intertwined physical, mental, and economic well-being). In participating in electoral politics, individuals transact with political entities that institutionalize and reify particular ideologies and policy platforms as political options; polities' opportunities to express their convictions and interests are circumscribed by politically available ideologies, made manifest as political parties. I argue that limited ideological options for political identification and – crucially – political dissent help to explain idiosyncratic political engagement, understood as electoral engagement that is inconsistent, that fractures accepted ideological commitments, or that is apathetic.

Often, individuals' political aims match up poorly with available ideologies; when individuals' values and interests don't align with any particular party's stated or demonstrated aims, they may be faced with a limited panel of available political identifications that don't quite fit. The result is political behavior that may appear illogical or ignorant, but which may in fact reflect closely held convictions or interests that map poorly onto any specific party's platform. Voters may switch political parties, espouse contradictory views in federal versus local elections, vote in ways that privilege

their values over their material interests, or abstain from political engagement at all in order to negotiate a party system that is ideologically ill-suited to respond to complex and varied political demands.

If we understand that political agents transact with systems that are limited both in terms of the ideologies they represent and the political outcomes they affect, it becomes easier to understand troubling and seemingly inconsistent political behavior; for instance, voters who supported Trump in the 2024 election but also voted to protect abortion access in their states often expressed dismay about the Republican party's abortion stance but hope that their economic situations would improve compared with their materials circumstances under recent Democratic administrations. Some New York voters supported both Trump for president and leftist House Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez; although Ocasio-Cortez herself expressed disbelief, we can understand these voters as expressing dissent with moderate economic policies by voting for candidates espousing more radical economic ideologies, although those candidates do not represent consistent or even similar economic views. On my diagnosis, idiosyncratic political behaviors such as these are not individual expressions of ignorance or illogic; rather, they are endemic to ideologically limited party systems that admit a narrow range of options for political identification. This understanding permits a structural critique of political systems' responsiveness to their polities' ideological commitments and material concerns.

## **G**

### **Lori Gallegos: Formative Feelings: Telling the Tale of Immigrant Experiences**

It's an all-too common problem: Some people have frequent, unsettling experiences of oppression that other people are oblivious to. If the person experiencing oppression speaks out, they risk being invalidated—they are told that their perception is inaccurate, or that their reaction is overblown. In response, scholars have sought to explain some of the subtle forms of everyday injustices using the concepts of microaggressions, implicit bias, hostile climates, and exclusionary atmospheres. Although these concepts are illuminating, they aren't principally designed to portray subjective experiences of oppression. As a result, they overlook important features of that experience that help to explain why there is often such a gulf between the way in which different parties perceive injustices.

This paper addresses that gap by concentrating on the emotional lives of undocumented immigrants and their family members. I use Jesse Prinz's embodied appraisal theory of emotion to analyze Carlos Sánchez and Grant Silva's writings about their experiences as Mexican American. This theory of emotion identifies emotions are the way the body gives us information about how we are faring in the world. It allows me to give an account of the distinctive forms of fear and anxiety that pervade the lives of undocumented immigrants and their family members. My principal argument is that,

often, everyday experiences of oppression are temporally extended. That is, formative events from the past—for example, terror from the threats of deportation, arrest, family separation, marginalization, and exclusion from society—shape the meaning of events in the present. Even the subtlest of eliciting objects—a neighbor who doesn't smile or wave, an American flag, a police car, a bank teller who doesn't make eye contact—trigger bodily responses that indicate that one does not belong, that one is not safe. The constellation of everyday experiences acquires its significance because of the way that it triangulates off of other parts of one's personal narrative. By focusing on the emotions that characterize experiences of immigration, we gain a fuller understanding of why an experience that appears to some people as unremarkable has great significance to others.

### **Jeffrey Gauthier: Intersectionality and Its Discontents**

The problem of intersectionality centrally concerns how to maintain the basic tenet of feminism that women suffer oppression as a specific class while at the same time taking into account that, as individuals, women also belong to distinct cultural groups and may suffer from other forms of oppression. In social policy discussions, descriptions of intersectionality have tended to cluster around two different claims. Sometimes, the problem is taken to consist of feminists' failure to perceive how various distinct oppressive systems (sex, race, class, etc.) overlap or interact with one another (1). Often, however, the claim is a stronger one, namely that oppressive systems are intertwined in such a manner that they are not distinct systems at all (2). In her most recent work on the subject, Sally Haslanger defends the latter view. Criticizing Robin Dembroff's definition of intersectionality as overlapping ideologies (3), she cites the difficulties in defining women as a "group" as well as the role that systems play in constituting subordinated groups to argue that "there isn't a form of oppression that women suffer as women [*italics Haslanger's*]" (1). Rather, "there is one integrated system that differentiates social relations in complex and overlapping ways along the lines of what we recognize as gender, race, class, etc." (2) In my paper, I critically assess whether the difficulties that Haslanger cites should be taken to support the claim that sex (as well as race, class, etc.) cannot constitute distinct systems of oppression. While I am sympathetic to certain aspects of her critique of Dembroff, I contend that intersectional complexity is compatible with the existence of distinct functional systems.

Citations:

(1) For example, Amanda Matos describes intersectionality as examining "how gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, socioeconomic status, physical and mental ability, and immigration status (among other experiences) overlap" [*italics mine*]. Amanda Matos, "Centering Women of Color through Intersectional Policymaking: Let's Start with Abortion Access," Kennedy School Review, January 7, 2019  
<https://studentreview.hks.harvard.edu/centering-women-of-color-through-intersectional-policymaking-lets-start-with-abortion-access/>

(2) For example, the glossary of the American Psychological Association's "Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Framework" page defines intersectionality as follows: "The ways in which oppressive institutions (racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, xenophobia, classism, etc.) are interconnected and cannot be examined separately from one another" [*italics mine*]. <https://www.apa.org/about/apa/equity-diversity-inclusion/framework>

(3) Robin Dembroff, "Intersection Is not Identity," in *Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics*, ed. Ruth Chang and Amia Srinivasan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), pp.383-98.

(4) Sally Haslanger, "Social Systems and Intersectional Oppression," in *Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics*, ed. Chang and Srinivasan, p. 420. See also "Why I Don't Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne's *Down Girl*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 101 (2020): 220-9; "Failures of Individualism: The Materiality of Social Systems," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 53 (2020): 512-34; "Systemic and Structural Injustice: Is There a Difference?" *Philosophy* 98 (2023): 1-27.

(5) Haslanger, "Social Systems and Intersectional Oppression," p. 421.

### **Sebastián Tinajero González: De la teoría a la práctica, el argumento del rango adecuado y la restricción a la libertad de movimiento (From Theory to Practice: The Argument of Proper Range and the Restriction of Freedom of Movement)**

A partir de 1948, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (DUDH) afirmó en su artículo 13, fracción 1, que toda persona posee el derecho a circular de manera libre y a escoger su lugar de residencia dentro del territorio de un Estado. Posteriormente, en 2018, la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU) señaló que todas las personas deberían tener la oportunidad de desplazarse dentro de su propio país con la intención de escoger en dónde vivir. Los motivos por los cuales las personas desean desplazarse de un lugar a otro con la intención de morar en sitios distintos a los de residencia pueden ser diversos.

La visualización y fundamentación del derecho a la libertad de movimiento fue forjado a partir de reconocer un interés genuino y una necesidad existente en las personas para hacer efectiva su libertad de movimiento. No obstante, al igual que la libertad de expresión, en algunos casos esta suerte de desplazamiento puede ser limitada. De manera tal que, han surgido propuestas teóricas que tienen la intención de generar argumentaciones robustas a favor de restringir la libertad de movimiento. Tal como es el caso del planteamiento del rango adecuado.

De manera tal que, la intención de la presente exposición es ahondar en el argumento del rango adecuado. Buscando con ello señalar los peligros teóricos que se pueden

presentar ante una postura filosófica de índole social cuando ella busca ser aplicada en un plano práctico. En otros términos, se pretende abordar las implicaciones que pueden emerger en las sociedades y contextos políticos cuando se acepta la restricción a la libertad de movimiento con base en argumentaciones filosóficas.

#### English translation:

Beginning in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirmed in Article 13, Section 1, that every person has the right to move freely and to choose their residence within the territory of a state. Later, in 2018, the United Nations (UN) emphasized that all individuals should have the opportunity to move within their own country with the intention of choosing where to live. The reasons why people may wish to relocate from one place to another to reside in a different location can be diverse. The recognition and justification of the right to freedom of movement were built upon acknowledging a genuine interest and an existing need for individuals to exercise this freedom. However, like the right to freedom of expression, in certain cases this kind of movement can be limited. As such, theoretical proposals have emerged aiming to construct robust arguments in favor of restricting freedom of movement—one example being the "appropriate range" argument.

The purpose of this presentation, then, is to delve into the appropriate range argument, aiming to highlight the theoretical risks that may arise when a socially-oriented philosophical stance is applied in a practical context. In other words, the goal is to address the implications that may emerge in societies and political contexts when restrictions on freedom of movement are accepted based on philosophical reasoning.

#### **Casey Grippo: The Myth of I-Mode Solidarity**

Contemporary philosophers writing on solidarity often make the distinction between a stronger "We-mode" solidarity and a weaker "I-mode" solidarity (Szanto 2023; Gould 2024). We-mode solidarity speaks to the cooperative relationship between members of a tight-knit group, emphasizing a group's shared end and the reliance members have on one another. On the other hand, I-mode solidarity is invoked to explain an individual's willingness to incur high personal costs to act in favor of a group's ideals. In this paper, I argue that I-mode solidarity could be better understood as the altogether separate practice of allyship rather than solidarity. I contrast solidarity to allyship, suggesting that they are two incongruent modes of social cooperation. Allyship, as a practice, I claim, is separable from solidarity because it is an expression of loyalty based on identification. Allyship has a determinable subject and object. While the allyship framework can work interpersonally when an ally is aligning themselves to a particular other, allyship cannot function as the basis of a politic or as a demand of justice, as the framework itself reduces particularities to the sameness and differences of identity, thereby missing the unique particularities co-created by the contextual demands of the given social situation. Thus, allyship objectifies the one needing an ally by reducing

them to their publicly coherent identities and making them fungible. Allyship's mode of relating should not be misunderstood as any kind of solidarity, for the relations are entirely distinct. Solidarity, properly conceived, can avoid this objectification and harm due to its grounds in shared evaluative frameworks (or, visions for the future, ideology, etc.) rather than identification of being (Gould 2007, 2024; Scholz 2008; Shelby 2005; Szanto 2023). Thinking of solidarity as a relationship between subject and group rather than interpersonally allows us to recenter the oppositional struggle at the heart of solidarity. Solidarity as a practice of cooperative struggling allows us to think of each other not as objects of sameness and difference but as partners and teammates irrespective of identity kinship. With the proper grounding, there needn't be a distinction between We-mode and I-mode solidarity. Moreover, by disentangling solidarity from allyship, we can see that what may look like pernicious forms of solidarity (Scholz 2024) could more aptly be classified as a fault of allyship.

## H

### **Aubrial Harrington: Algorithmic Borders and Structural Violence**

Borders have long served as sites of exclusion, and today, algorithmic technologies are reshaping the borders of nations and communities, making them more pervasive and less visible. The increasing deployment of artificial intelligence in immigration enforcement and border surveillance is often justified under the guise of efficiency, objectivity, and enhanced security (DHS, 2025). However, AI-driven immigration systems and border enforcement are not neutral amendments to existing structures. They function as instruments of structural violence (Galtung, 1969; Vorobej, 2008) and biopolitical control (Foucault, 1978), expanding the state's capacity to regulate migrant populations, deepen precarity, and mechanizing border enforcement.

AI in migration governance is not politically neutral. AI-driven risk assessment tools, biometric surveillance, and algorithmic decision-making in asylum cases inherit and amplify biases embedded in historical migration policies (Molnar, 2020; Amnesty International, 2024). AI operates within pre-existing structures of exclusion and securitization, prioritizing the policing of movement over humanitarian concerns (Bellanova & Ghezzi, 2020). As Foucault's concept of biopower illustrates, AI is an extension of the state's ability to categorize and control populations at the level of life itself, determining whose movement is restricted, whose claims are processed, and whose bodies are subjected to digital surveillance. By abstracting the social and political context from their calculations, these systems operationalize existing state priorities of securitization over humanitarian concerns (Bellanova & Ghezzi, 2020). This leads to greater criminalization of migrants while shielding the state and private actors from accountability.

AI in border enforcement mechanizes and optimizes state violence, transforming migration control into an automated system of exclusion and deterrence. AI-powered

surveillance tools, such as biometric tracking, facial recognition, and predictive policing, expand the reach of border enforcement beyond physical checkpoints (Molnar, 2020; Amnesty International, 2024). Automated drone patrols and AI-enhanced sensor networks turn border regions into militarized spaces, where human discretion is replaced by algorithmic threat assessments (Bellanova & Ghezzi, 2020). AI does not merely assist enforcement, it reconfigures it, shifting border policing from reactive enforcement to preemptive control. By accelerating detention, deportation, and biometric data-sharing across agencies, AI expands the punitive infrastructure of migration control while obscuring the responsibility of individual decision-makers (Molnar, 2020). The result is a technologized border regime that makes structural violence more efficient, less visible, and harder to contest.

The U.S. immigration system is already deeply unjust and AI does not fix its inequities. Instead, it optimizes its harms. From a feminist perspective, rather than deepening surveillance and predictive policing, policy interventions should prioritize decentralized, community-driven migration support, transparency in asylum processing, and legal protections that center migrant agency (Data Feminism, 2020; Amnesty International, 2024). AI in border enforcement is not a question of efficiency, it is a question of power, exclusion, and the governance of life itself.

By drawing on the concepts of structural violence and biopolitical theory, this paper demonstrates that AI in migration governance does not merely reflect state power, it actively transforms and extends it, embedding preemptive control, expanded surveillance, and economic precarity into the very architecture of border enforcement. A just approach to migration policy requires confronting the political economy of migration governance rather than automating its worst excesses.

## **Cal Howland: Sexual Orientation Has Open Texture**

In many ways, one can trace LGBT+ history through tensions and divisions between the LGB and the T. The role of trans people and trans identities in 'undefining' sexual orientations, loosening strict boxes, and introducing unexpected identities into largely cis communities has been pivotal for contemporary progressive conceptions of the relationship between sexuality and gender. However, the current philosophical literature often struggles to reconcile and understand various claims made by progressive trans-inclusive feminists about this relationship. In this paper, I will focus on two such claims.

First, call the idea that "sexuality is not wholly a matter of, nor systematically explained by gender stuff", gender-free sexual orientation. One, now rather commonplace, example that venerates this claim is that even though a lesbian might be simply glossed as a "woman-loving woman", not all lesbians are women. It is possible to be a non-binary lesbian. Second, call the idea that "individual people, including trans people, and communities meaningfully explain their sexuality by appealing to gender stuff, gender-bound sexual-orientation. This claim is illustrated by the fact that many transwomen

understand their lesbianism through their womanhood. In other words, they make claims like "I'm a lesbian, because I am a woman!"

The purpose of this paper two-fold. First, to provide evidence for why trans-inclusive feminists should want to endorse both claims despite the claims having a prima facie tension. And second, to propose that one way to resolve the tension is to claim that even though there are efficient ways of opting into a sexual orientation, utilizing gender-based claims, these ways miss the nuances of gender identity. Just because these efficient ways exist doesn't make the category of sexual orientation clean and neat: It's open ended and messy. This conclusion leads me to defend the bold claim that gender is sometimes sufficient, but never necessary for making sexuality-based claims.

J

### **Eber Jimenez: Democracia formal y participativa: actualidad de la teoría y praxis de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (Formal and Participatory Democracy: The Relevance of the Theory and Praxis of Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez)**

Para el filósofo Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez la democracia tiene dos variantes de praxis, formal y participativa, ambas con implicaciones políticas que propician o anulan la potencial llegada a una dictadura. El concepto de democracia es uno de los pilares en la conformación de occidente: libertad, justicia e igualdad son los valores que la sustentan como concepto, forma de organización y gobierno. No obstante, bajo la lógica de su ejercicio también es posible su autodestrucción, es decir, la eliminación de la libertad, justicia e igualdad por la vía democrática. En el presente trabajo con el objetivo de entender los mecanismos de la democracia en estas dos formas, se analizará en primer lugar las características teóricas de ambas, la puesta en marcha de cada una y su función práctica como parámetro para la realización humana. Además de examinar como el ejercicio de estas dos formas de praxis democrática pueden dotar de conciencia o propiciar la enajenación de los ciudadanos. Si bien, la obra de Sánchez Vázquez será la bibliografía primaria, en el entramado conceptual es menester hacer uso de los clásicos del marxismo así como el análisis del concepto de democracia en sus variantes en la actualidad política.

#### English translation:

For the philosopher Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, democracy has two variants of praxis—formal and participatory—each with political implications that can either foster or prevent the potential rise of dictatorship. The concept of democracy is one of the pillars of Western civilization: freedom, justice, and equality are the core values that sustain it as a concept, a form of organization, and a system of government. However, under the logic of its own practice, democracy can also lead to its self-destruction—that is, the elimination of freedom, justice, and equality through democratic means.

This paper seeks to understand the mechanisms of democracy in these two forms. First, it will analyze the theoretical characteristics of each, their practical implementation, and their role as a parameter for human realization. It will also examine how the exercise of these two forms of democratic praxis can either foster consciousness or lead to the alienation of citizens.

While the work of Sánchez Vázquez will serve as the primary bibliography, the conceptual framework also requires engagement with classical Marxist thought and an analysis of democracy in its contemporary political variations.

### **Paul D. Jorgensen: Intellectuals and Ecofascism: Antonio Gramsci on the Connections between Madison Grant and Roberto Michels**

Antonio Gramsci's trenchant note in his Prison Notebooks connecting the white supremacy of early-twentieth century American environmentalism to intellectual supporters of Italian fascism has yet to receive the scholarly attention it deserves. The note is both a warning and a guide to the redevelopment of ecofascism in the twenty-first century. I use the parallels Gramsci draws between Madison Grant and Roberto Michels in that note to make two intersecting arguments. First, following Joseph A. Buttigieg's (1990) method of reading Gramsci, I argue that Buttigieg's translation of the Prison Notebooks breathes new life into Gramsci's criticisms of Michels. Before his translation, existing volumes of Gramsci's work present a dichotomous critique of Michels, one methodological and the other political, with overwhelming emphasis on the former. Gramsci's note demonstrates that he approached Michels as he did intellectuals more generally. Michels' function as an intellectual, both his methodology and his politics, was to support the fascist regime, but this was not a function that Michels was trained to serve and did not serve until his alignment with Mussolini. Gramsci's critique is that Michels' fascist politics informed his methodological approach during that time. Second, I argue that Gramsci's note exemplifies his concern with (and links Michels directly to) the function of intellectuals to help develop and maintain hegemony. Intellectuals provide either the foundational ideas for a class ascending to hegemonic status or repackage dominant narratives to maintain hegemony under changing conditions. Climate change alters the narratives required to maintain the hegemonic status of the capitalist class away from neoliberalism and toward ecofascism. While these two narratives are not mutually exclusive, the ecofascist narrative has not been confronted in its totality. I root the contemporary ecofascist narrative in the collective works of Garrett Hardin, an intellectual who repackaged the thought of Thomas Malthus, Madison Grant, and others to produce a narrative that explains how the dominant class could maintain power and appear to confront ecological crises. Policymakers under neoliberalism relied heavily on Milton Friedman's interpretation of Adam Smith as justification for many economic policies. As neoliberalism wanes in the face of climate change, policymakers increasingly exhibit sympathies for Garrett

Hardin's interpretation of Adam Smith, which provides the foundation for the strengthening of ecofascism.

## **K**

### **Laura Kane: AI-Communication and Relational Ethics**

As evinced by the recent tragic death of Sewell Setzer III, a 14-year-old who took his life after forming an obsessive relationship with an AI-powered chat bot on Character.ai, AI-communication has moved beyond informative-based tasks into the realm of relationship-based communication. In this paper I focus on two specific concerns for AI-communication that arise under a care ethics framework: 1) AI-communication impacts how we develop and maintain relationships with other humans; and 2) AI-communication has the potential to impact how we perceive our real-world selves and our role responsibilities. Specifically, I argue that AI-communication is likely to impact our communicative goals away from those involving a cooperative give-and-take (including empathetic understanding of others' needs and desires) and instead shape communicative goals around self-interested, instrumental ends. This shift may potentially affect how we view our real-world role responsibilities to others as well as our willingness to be vulnerable and trusting with other humans.

### **Joshua Keton: Public Reason(s) as Social Reason(s)**

Rawls's idea of public reason and its attendant duty of civility have received voluminous treatment in the literature. While it was described by Rawls (and those that followed) as an inherently moral concept giving rise to a moral duty, there are conceptual problems in characterizing both the scope and content of the ideal and the duties it grounds. This focus, I argue, is the byproduct of carving the conceptual space of reasons between the particular and prudential and the universal and moral. I argue that reconceptualizing normative space to allow room for a type of normativity, social normativity, that grounds reasons which are neither particular nor universal allows a re-framing of the debate over public reason that enables progress on some of the deeper conceptual problems at root in the debate over the idea of public reasons and the duties it grounds when understood solely through the moral lens in which they have traditionally been framed. I contend that understanding certain conditions as giving rise to social reasons, which are neither fully particular nor fully universal, can help explain types of normativity—e.g., legal normativity—that have defied adequate explanation in the traditional literature.

### **W. John Koolage and Eve McGlynn: Editorialized Evidence: Monuments, Mindshaping, and the Role of Values in the Social Sciences**

Our goal in this paper is to examine what we call editorialized evidence. In particular we are interested in the role of monuments in the context of study of cultural landscapes,

where they are key figures in the built environment and evidence of a community's view of a given event(s). These objects are evidence, but the role of human agency needs to be acknowledged both in making them evidence and in determining their evidential role in scientific analysis or inquiry. Heather Douglas (2023) argues that revealing the role of values improves the epistemic status of a science, and we intend to begin this project for moments and editorial evidence more generally.

In studies of the cultural landscape, there exist material contributions to the built environment with a wide variety of intentionalities and politics. Previous work in geography talks about how these landscapes transcend human temporalities (Massey 2006) and still reflect shared emotional experience (Jackson 1980). By taking monuments as specific authored contributions, we build on work regarding the tension between the explicit intention of their creators and how they are received over time (Shanken 2022) to further explore the impact on the scientific observer. We argue that these clearly value-laden figures, editorialized evidence, provide an opportunity to investigate the role of values in the field of human geography. Editorialized evidence also presents an invitation to engagement by many different groups of knowers, providing an opportunity to think about its role in generating collaborative, or at least plural, forms of inquiry, expanding the range of inquiry about social procedural objectivity (Longino 1990, Wylie 2015, among others).

As many monuments explicitly propose a specific version of history, we also explore the possibility of understanding editorialized evidence in relation to theories of memory, generating a novel line of inquiry at the intersection of the study of evidence and the study of memory. Some very recent research suggests that episodic memory is mindshaped (McCarroll and Andonovski, forthcoming). In this way, considering the idea of externalized or embodied memory, such as monuments, in geography opens a line for thinking about the ways in which memory is evidence and the role of social values in "observations" or "evidence" in a scientific process.

Monuments can be understood as mindshaping because they propose a specific vision of an event as it resides in place. If it is fruitful to explore episodic memory as mindshaping, we maintain that it is fruitful to explore editorialized evidence, such as monuments, in a similar way - processing the intentions or agency of others not in an explanatory pattern, but rather as they harmonize mental states in others. This part of our work is preliminary, but should be very relevant to understanding the role of values, agency, and intention in editorialized evidence, or simply understanding the nature of editorialized evidence.

As a cross-disciplinary team, this project is fundamentally collaborative research, expanding the fields of geography and philosophy of science. We comment on this in our section on social procedural objectivity and dynamic pluralism.

**L**

## **Aurora Laybourn-Candlish: Transgressive Healing: Theorizing Disability in the Works of Gloria Anzaldúa and Julia Kristeva**

Anzaldúa and Kristeva are both thinkers of transformation, crossing, and transgression. In their own way, each are healers, attending to the wounds that are a necessary condition of our being in the world with others and our self-alienation. For Anzaldúa transformation occurs in earthquake moments: seismic ruptures that bring down the walls that we build around ourselves leaving us exposed and in a liminal space. With the crumbling of these walls comes the consciousness that we are not contained within our skin, further fracturing the dichotomies of mind/body and matter/spirit. Due to the porosity of the skin we are at the same time unbound and embodied. Within Kristeva's writing, transformation occurs in epileptic fits and fragmented visions: moments of psychic and bodily exposure, flashes of light and flesh. Travesía, or crossing in Anzaldúa's work, is described through the metaphor of bridges, thresholds on which we are forced to confront our precarity. Although they go by different names, and they inhabit different worlds, le sujet-en-procès and the new mestiza are both defined and shaped by their temporary able-bodiedness. During the course of a lifetime we experience different forms of interdependency at times we are cared for and at other times we care after. There is no logic or rhythm for this, our able-bodiedness, if we ever had it to begin with, is subject to change. Every version of a life well lived ends with the eventual exhaustion of our bodies, be it through old age or illness. While Kristeva explicitly takes up the issue of disability in her work, describing it as the catalyst toward a new humanism, Anzaldúa never addressed the topic in her writing. Even though her hormone disorder and diabetes had a profound influence on her *Autohistoria* she never identified as disabled. In interviews she rejected the identity in the same breath that she encouraged interdisciplinary uptakes of her writing by disability theorists. Despite the lack of discussion of disability, the nonlinear growth and psychic development that is paired with a careful consideration of the vulnerability of our minds and bodies makes Anzaldúa's work especially useful for theorizing disability. My aim is to read both of these theorists together to draw out a transgressive model of healing that rejects both linearity and abled-bodiedness.

## **Dan Lowe: How Ideology Confirms Itself: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Looping**

Social ontologists (Hacking, 1995; Haslanger, 2012) and feminist philosophers (Fricker, 2007; Tessman, 2005) have noticed that a typical feature of oppressive systems is looping. In cases of looping, a dominant group holds an ideology which involves a certain image of a subordinate group; this creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where the subordinate group is caused to resemble that image.

When looping is not recognized for what it is, it reinforces the dominant group's beliefs. For instance, slaveowners who believed in natural black inferiority also forbid slaves to

read, and then pointed to slaves' illiteracy as evidence of their intellectual inferiority. In such cases, dominant groups gain confidence in oppressive ideologies by observing the very effects they produced. This reinforcement happens across two kinds of looping: Cases where the members of subordinate groups actually have the characteristics in question, and cases where they only seem to. Focusing on the epistemic importance of looping shows the relevance of both kinds, since the mere appearance of a characteristic provides evidential reinforcement.

This paper argues that looping is a key mechanism by which oppressive ideologies are maintained. It then seeks to explain how looping is possible. How are dominant groups able to reliably construct subordinate groups to resemble the ideological image of them? I offer an account by which subordinate groups have incentives to conform to the ideological image of them. This account helps uncover not just how looping happens, but why it is so often not seen by members of dominant groups for what it is.

The upshot is that ideology does not merely passively justify an oppressive status quo – ideology actually creates the evidence which sustains itself.

**M**

### **Arely Sofia Macias-Licon: An Argument for an Asymmetric Theory of Immigration**

Philosophers of immigration have maintained the debate between open- and closed-borders for too long. While one side proposes that all states should be minimally strict with their immigration policies because of the right to freedom of movement, the other argues that all states should become stricter than they are or as strict as they wish to be. I find this distinction to be outdated, problematic, and unfair to low-income states. In order to develop a more holistic theory of immigration, we must look at the relationship between sending countries, receiving states, and immigrants. Here, I develop an alternative solution to the open-closed border debate, one that prioritizes the immigrant and champions asymmetry. I propose that countries in the Global South, like Mexico, should be much more restrictive when accepting immigrants and long-stay visitors from northern countries, like the United States, whereas countries in the North should be more accepting of immigrants from the South. I discuss how the language of hospitality forgoes any consideration of systemic injustices and owed responsibilities, as well as argue that the autonomy of white wealthy 'immigrant' in Mexico is not compromised by his status as 'unauthorized' in the same way an immigrant from the South is in the North. To fortify my argument, I also expand on David Miller's concept of 'Particularity Claimants' by defending and applying James Chamberlain's Solidarity argument and Marion Young's concept of social connection. I end the article by advocating for the development of institutions that prioritize the migrant and reduce the injustices that lead to displacement by ensuring the enforcement of owed responsibilities.

## **Lisa Madura: Habit, Normativity, and Oppression**

In *Human Nature and Conduct* (2007 [1922]) John Dewey writes that “[m]an is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.” This idea highlights the primacy of habit in human experience and world-building, and it suggests social theorizing ought to take greater account of the role habit plays in human agency and social construction. Work of this sort has recently been done in the area of race theory, where scholars like Shannon Sullivan, Terrance MacMullan, and Helen Ngo have provided detailed accounts of how race is lived, and how white privilege and hegemony is maintained, through racializing habits of perception, cognition, and bodily comportment. This relatively new literature on race and habit offers valuable resources and frameworks for understanding, but one thing that remains undertheorized is the relationship between habit and normativity. More specifically, the literature on race and habit is preoccupied with analyzing individual habits and their effects, at the expense of a more holistic understanding of racial habit and a richer understanding of its normative dimensions. The fuller picture I want to draw requires carefully articulating the different ways we can understand habit’s relationship to normativity, and their connection to racial practices and oppression. As I argue in this paper, there are at least three ways to understand the normative significance of habit. The first two have to do with the content of the habit. Habits can be measured in their efficacy as means to achieve reflectively endorsed ends (external normativity). Habit can also generate norms and standards via the establishment of custom (internal normativity). These two understandings are represented in accounts of race and habit. But habit can also be evaluated by whether and to what extent it achieves the condition of being at-home in the world. This third form of normativity emerges when we take Dewey’s insight to heart, and consider that habituation itself is vital to basic human function. As the “primacy thesis” expressed in the quoted passage from Dewey suggests, in addition to taking stock of the individually problematic habits related to race, we need also take stock of the way differently racialized groups are afforded differential access the benefits of habituation. The normative significance of habituation becomes most evident when we consider habit from a phenomenological perspective. Doing so allow us to critique whiteness as more than a set of habits, but as a problematic mode of habituation, which I call “anti-social habit,” that involves being too at-ease, or too “at home,” while simultaneously depriving others of the benefits of habituation. This phenomenological asymmetry in the lived experience of race marks a distinct site of racial oppression.

## **Lav McKittrick-Sweitzer: Care Exploitation as an Oppressive Double Bind**

The exploitation of care is a pervasive structural injustice. It appears, for example, in our education, healthcare, and military systems. The wrong of care exploitation, when successful, is a failure to respect one’s dignity by taking advantage of their vulnerability of caring about (as distinct from caring labor). This occurs when one is called to aid by

another (person or institution) in the flourishing of some subject, and the call is made because one has the general disposition to care about, or cares about the subject of said call. Whoever issues the call expects some benefit from doing so – primarily, evading their own caring responsibilities. Drawing on the recent work of Sukaina Hirji (2021), I argue that merely attempting to structurally exploit one's care is a unique form of injustice - standing apart from other forms of exploitation - because of the way it manifests as an oppressive double bind. This renders the caring individual's choice "necessarily self-undermining: whatever they do, they are forced to act against themselves, becoming a mechanism in their own oppression". (Hirji 2021, 653) Either one answers the call, perpetuating the idea that people who care will take on extra burdens simply because they care, reinforcing the systemic injustice, choosing against one's own flourishing and self-authorship. Or one rejects the call, maintaining the status quo and feeling as if one cannot realize one's values that are otherwise consistent with care while resisting oppression; one cannot care and cannot legitimately be an author of one's own choices. Importantly, though, there are complexities - unregistered by Hirji's account - that arise within the double bind, and are related to the realization of one's own moral good.

Once it is established that structural care exploitation oppressively doubly binds caring people, we may be better positioned to understand both (i) how, by virtue of being an ODB, care exploitation is harmful even when it is unsuccessful (as opposed to other forms of exploitation), as well as (ii) why being subjected to care exploitation often leads caring individuals to resent that they value caring.

### **Jose Jorge Mendoza: How to Think about Xenophobia and Racism**

When we look at the world today, we see a dramatic rise in nefarious forms of nationalism. These nefarious forms of nationalism are driven primarily by anti-immigrant sentiment and an undercurrent of White supremacy. There is a debate among academics and the public at large as to whether we should label such movements xenophobic or racist. Both sides of this debate make strong points. In this talk I consider both sides of the debate and offer a novel way to think about xenophobia and racism that does not miss nor minimize the role that race plays in nefarious forms of nationalism, but also does not overextend our shared conception of racism. Note: This abstract is in English, but I can (and would be happy to) give this talk in Spanish if there is room on the Ciudad Juárez portion of the program.

### **John Milkovich: "That Won't DO Anything!" Toward a Dualistic Conception of Liberation as a Response to Problematic Legalism**

For this paper, I will argue that a dualistic conception of liberation could be an effective method to address problematic legalism. Problematic legalism perceives liberation as merely a legal question and centers the agents of liberation within government institutions. Under this framework, people are only liberated if government institutions

say so. During periods of legalized oppression and mass violation of human rights, this conception of liberation can contribute to a sense of hopelessness among the oppressed and their allies because agency for liberation is perceived as only coming from state institutions. I argue that we should develop a dualistic conception of liberation that distinguishes between legal and social liberation. Borrowing from Neil Roberts's *Freedom as Marronage* and Ann Cudd's *Analyzing Oppression*, social liberation can be achieved by the oppressed and their allies through actively organizing against indirect forms of oppression like shame, false consciousness, and distorted desires (Cudd p. 176-183 2006 & Roberts p. 76-79 2015). Social liberation by the oppressed is the development of robust theories that object to indirect oppression and affirm the value of the oppressed as they are without assimilating or conforming to oppressive stereotypes. The importance of the distinction between legal and social liberation is twofold. One, the distinction between legal and social liberation expands the agency for liberation to include both state institutions and the oppressed. The oppressed and their allies can actively work toward developing theories that object to the oppressors' conception of the oppressed and educating the masses about these liberatory theories. Social liberation highlights the work each of us can do even under oppressive governments while not placing total responsibility for liberation on the oppressed themselves or their allies. Two, dualistic liberation can also help us recognize that law and policy are not the only places where the fight for liberation is. We must also fight for liberation in our learning communities. Paulo Freire and bell hooks have both written extensively on liberatory pedagogy, and we should use their work as a guidebook for how to enact social liberation. By establishing educational practices that embody transgressive and democratic principles, we can not only teach learners what social liberation is but also train learners for social liberation through our educational practice. A dualistic conception of liberation allows us to address a problematic form of legalism that perceives any act that does not lead to direct and immediate legal or policy change as pointless by establishing two separate forms of liberation. While legal liberation, which is determined by law and policy, is still important, social liberation is something we can all work toward. The results of our work toward social liberation may not be immediate or definitive, but they are no less important than decisive legal or policy change.

### **Olivia Sierra Miranda: La idea de comunidad en Marx y la Filosofía de la liberación (The Idea of Community in Marx and the Philosophy of Liberation)**

El siguiente trabajo se centra sobre la idea de comunidad en Marx y su encuentro con la filosofía de la liberación. La vida en comunidad es negada por el sistema capitalista en donde se muestra la negatividad comunitaria en la actividad productiva enajenante de los individuos que los aleja de sí mismos en su esencia comunitaria. Asimismo Marx propone una nueva sociedad donde la esencia sea, precisamente, alcanzar una vida humana en comunidad sin que esta sea mediada por el capital, es decir, sin que éste sea el fundamento que dirija y domine a la comunidad hasta casi su destrucción. Además de que el trabajo en este sistema es alienante y rompe con la comunidad, por ejemplo en

las fábricas que los aísla unos de otros a los trabajadores. Un pasaje donde podemos observar la idea de comunidad en Marx es en su obra "Elementos Fundamentales para la Crítica de la economía política (Grundrisse) 1857-1858 " En esta obra el autor del capital empezará poniendo como ejemplo la construcción de un camino que necesita una comunidad a toda costa, dice con respecto al mismo: [...] "Pero en la medida que este es necesario para la comunidad, y para cada individuo como miembro de la misma, no es un plus trabajo ejecutado por él, sino una parte de su trabajo necesario, del trabajo que es imprescindible para que él se reproduzca como miembro de la comunidad y con ello reproduzca la entidad comunitaria misma, la cual -vista así como un todo, la comunidad" ( Marx,2005,p.15). No importa la forma en como se le cobre, ya sea por los impuestos o por una prestación, no se debe considerar que es un plus trabajo. Finalizo la idea de comunidad en Marx con la filosofía de la liberación del filósofo. Enrique Dussel donde él comenta que primero está la comunidad y después los individuos. Para él, en el capitalismo, los seres humanos no se pueden relacionar más allá de las mercancías que retoma y amplía de la teoría de Marx: en palabras del él filósofo latinoamericano: El hombre sólo se relaciona en el "mundo" de las mercancías, en el mercado y fuera de él son totalidades solipsistas. Ésta es la crítica ética fundamental de Marx contra el capitalismo y contra su pretendida "libertad de los individuos" –que la realidad es enajenación individualista. (Dussel, 1998, p. 89). Desde que se nace ya se es un ser comunitario; el bebé tiene una madre, es necesario que unos brazos lo acunien para que el crezca, ya después por las circunstancias ajenas a él, este se individualizara, En este trabajo pretendo también exponer este punto.

#### English translation:

The following paper focuses on the idea of community in Marx and its encounter with the philosophy of liberation. Life in community is denied by the capitalist system, where we see the negation of community in the alienating productive activity of individuals, which distances them from themselves and their communal essence.

Marx also proposes a new society whose very essence is to achieve a human life in community, one not mediated by capital—that is, a society where capital is no longer the foundation that directs and dominates the community to the point of near destruction. In addition to the fact that labor in this system is alienating and breaks communal bonds—for example, in factories where workers are isolated from one another—Marx envisions an alternative.

A passage where we can observe Marx's idea of community is in his work *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (1857–1858). In this work, the author of *Capital* begins by giving the example of the construction of a road that a community absolutely needs. He writes:

"But insofar as this is necessary for the community, and for each individual as a member of it, it is not surplus labor performed by him, but rather part of his necessary

labor, of the labor that is essential for him to reproduce himself as a member of the community, and thereby reproduce the community entity itself, which—seen in this way as a whole—is the community.”

(*Marx, 2005, p. 15*)

It doesn't matter how it is paid for—whether through taxes or contributions—it should not be considered surplus labor.

I conclude the idea of community in Marx with the philosophy of liberation of the philosopher Enrique Dussel, who argues that the community comes first, and individuals come afterward. For him, in capitalism, human beings cannot relate to each other beyond the realm of commodities—a point he takes from and expands upon in Marx's theory. In the words of the Latin American philosopher:

“Man only relates within the 'world' of commodities; in the market and outside of it, individuals are isolated totalities.”

This is Marx's fundamental ethical critique of capitalism and of its supposed “freedom of the individual”—which, in reality, is individualist alienation. (*Dussel, 1998, p. 89*)

From the moment one is born, one is already a communal being: a baby has a mother; it is necessary for someone to hold it in their arms so it can grow. Only later, due to circumstances beyond its control, does the individual become individualized. In this paper, I also intend to explore this point.

### **Ángel Rafael Sosa Muñiz: ¿Quiénes son los que tienen el poder? La coerción y los límites del demos (Who are the Ones with the Power? Coercion and the Boundaries of the Demos)**

The discussion on whether a democratic state can guarantee the normative principles on which it is grounded ultimately points to the problem of boundaries raised in democratic theories. While many scholars have made efforts on providing solutions to the problem of boundaries by analyzing it in terms of the relation between coercion and liberal theories, looking at the problem from the perspective of how democratic states arise provides us a better ground for giving a solution for it. Positing a theory of how a democratic state arises will have consequences on the philosophical discussion of border policies and the rights owed to members or non-members of the state. Arash Abizadeh has argued that if a state exercises its sovereign power in the form of border control, then it must provide justification to those coerced. By positing that a justification in democratic terms entails actual participation in the State's decision-making, he argues for shared border control between the parties involved. In this paper I propose the assumptions of his argument collapse into a dilemma: we would be forced either to (i) reform our current political institutions to account for the justice described by Abizadeh's theory or (ii) to destroy those institutions to construct new

ones. An analysis on the two shows us how neither of those options are good outcomes for Liberal-Democratic States. Instead of claiming Coercion as the legitimatizing principle, a deep analysis on what the Demos in democratic theory is will show us how dialogical discourses, as posited by Habermas, constitutes a better ground for Liberal-Democratic states by explaining how those states arise from previous communities. Thus, solving the problem of boundaries as well as positing the ultimate foundations of democratic states.

**P**

### **Ariana Peruzzi: What Immigration Law?: Immigration Incompliance and the Rule of Law**

Sometimes legal systems fail to live up to rule of law ideals. When they fail badly enough, rule of law theorists say that we end up with something that is not really law at all, but a collection of legal actions, or arbitrary exercises of power. This essay argues that this is what we have instead of an immigration legal system. Bringing together legal and philosophical scholarship, I isolate seven ways in which our immigration law fails to live up to the most basic rule of law ideals. I then trace the implications of my view for how philosophers theorize incompliance with immigration law.

Lon Fuller famously argued that there are eight rule of law ideals. Immigration law fails on seven of these eight counts. Immigration law is: (1) often retroactive instead of prospective, (2) not sufficiently promulgated, (3) unintelligible, (4) inconsistent, (5) unstable, (6) its implementation does not accord with the letter of the law, and (7) at least sometimes, it demands the impossible. I offer specific instances of immigration laws that fail in these ways. But, more importantly, I aim to show how the foundational norms of immigration law (including the plenary power doctrine and norms of due process in immigration hearings) systematically generate these failures.

Not all areas of immigration law are compromised by these rule of law defects to the same extent. One area that is particularly compromised is the humanitarian protection legal regime, i.e., the complex of laws governing asylum-seekers, refugees, and recipients of various temporary humanitarian protection visas. This area of immigration law does not, I argue, deserve recognition as law. It cannot, therefore, be legitimate. If granted, this view has important implications for how we theorize incompliance with immigration law.

Contrary to recent scholarship (Silva 2019; Hidalgo 2019), I argue that irregular migration is not best understood as a form of justified civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is a conscientious response to injustice. When we evaluate whether civil disobedience is justified, we do so by weighing the duty to resist injustice against the pro-tanto obligation to obey the law. The background assumption here is that the civil

disobedient is breaking legitimate law. That background assumption cannot be taken for granted in the context of immigration law.

In my view, irregular migrants are not generally best understood as civil disobedients who conscientiously break laws. They are more like protagonists in a Kafka novel, forced to navigate absurd and labyrinthine systems that purport to be intelligible law but are designed to impede compliance. When migrants don't comply, they are responding not to injustice (or not only), but to the failures of the legal system to function as a legal system. We can better understand and justify in compliance in respect to immigration laws on these grounds.

### **Carissa Phillips-Garrett: The Asymmetry of Anger**

In this paper, I argue that the ethical value of anger is asymmetrical, depending on the position of the person experiencing anger: while anger on the part of the person experiencing oppression is fitting and may be useful, anger experienced by a privileged person who notices the oppression is self-indulgent. For the person experiencing the wrong, anger is fitting to the situation: since they have been wronged, anger is the appropriate response to the wrong. Additionally, anger may be useful for the person who has been wronged, since it may both be epistemically valuable in uncovering oppression and helping others to see it, as well as therapeutic to feel what is appropriate to the circumstances. In contrast, however, I argue that anger on the part of the privileged person who notices the wrongs but who has not herself been wronged should not be morally encouraged since it is self-indulgent. This is because anger for such a person is neither fitting nor useful. First, it is not fitting since the person merely observes the wrong rather than experiencing it herself. Secondly (and more importantly), the anger is not useful since it centers the experience on the privileged person's own anger, rather than on the oppression itself. Instead of responding to the wrong in a way that addresses the oppression, this anger can distract from real change because the cathartic experience of the anger exhausts the individual, rather than channeling it into productive action. After defending my positive argument, I will then respond to three objections: first, that anger is never the appropriate response since anger is never fitting or useful; second, that anger is not merely useful but necessary for maintaining self-respect; and third, that anger does not deplete energy for responding to oppression but is in fact motivating.

### **Gaile Pohlhaus: Epistemic Communities: Boundaries and Border Crossings**

Recent work in feminist epistemology has brought attention to the concept of an epistemic community as an important aspect of knowing the world and resistantly challenging epistemic oppression. Critiques of Miranda Fricker's work that emphasize the existence of more than one set of "hermeneutical resources" for knowing the world (e.g. Dotson 2012, Pohlhaus 2012, and Mason 2011) suggest that different epistemic communities rely on different sets of hermeneutical resources to know the world.

Brianna Toole (2019, 2021, 2022, 2022) has refocused feminist attention on the idea that a feminist standpoint is something for which struggle in community with others is necessary. And Elena Ruíz's recent book, *Structural Violence: The Makings of Settler Colonial Impunity* (2024), examines the idea of "epistemic wealth" as the capacity among particular classes of people to hoard epistemic resources by exploiting other classes over time and over multiple generations. This too suggests something like the idea of a difference in epistemic communities (or at the very least different epistemic groups). In this paper I focus on questions concerning the boundaries of an epistemic community (what constitutes an epistemic community? When does a challenge to an epistemic community change its borders and when does such a challenge simply mean the agent is no longer working within the borders of the epistemic community?) and the possibilities for moving in and out of epistemic communities (how does one enter an epistemic community? Can one be expelled from an epistemic community? Are there epistemic communities one should not enter and if so why?).

### **Gail Presbey: Challenging Epistemic Marginalization through Multiple Museum Narratives and Dialog across Borders**

Chico Mendez explained that in his mentoring to become an activist for the rubber tappers in Brazil, he learned to look at events from the perspectives of several different newspapers. By realizing how different parties to an issue framed and experienced the same issue, he could more effectively design a response and a solution. With that in mind, I want to look at key examples of people from the United States, who, through traveling abroad and visiting museums and engaging in dialogue with people there, come to see events and issues framed in radically different way than mainstream narratives in the U.S. Such a reframing is necessary for a clearer perspective. Such dialogic encounters are examples of an "epistemology of resistance" as described by Jose Medina. It is also needed to save the U.S. government and citizens from a myopic perspective of isolationism.

I am choosing examples particularly appropriate for a social philosophy conference that is located on both sides of the U.S. – Mexico border. In the city of Juarez, two clergy from the U.S., Betty Campbell and Peter Hinde have made Juarez their home for decades. There, they founded Tabor House, a Catholic Worker community. I will focus on their solidarity work with Cuba. As Catholics, they wanted to challenge dominant narratives that painted the Cuban revolution as anti-religious. They visited Cuba several times in the late 1980s and have an unpublished manuscript based on their many interviews with Cuban people.

I will also cover the role of museums, focusing on the Bay of Pigs museum, the Che Guevara masoleum (Conjunto Escultórico Memorial Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara) and the Fidel Castro Center and museum, as well as the "Museum of the Denounce" (Memorial de la Denuncia). The latter was revised and reopened in 2017 and focuses on the history of CIA actions in Cuba. While museums in Cuba and the U.S. can have

dueling ideologies, and each museum can have its slant and can be taken to task for its omissions and commissions, nevertheless it is an important learning tool for those from the U.S. to see a history written from the point of view of a country that suffered from the aggression of the U.S. This new perspective is exactly what these museums provide.

I round up my analysis with a study of the Naval Academy Museum in Veracruz, Mexico, which gives an account of the 1914 U.S. invasion of Veracruz quite different than one you might see in U.S. textbooks. Such a presentation is a cautionary tale for U.S. expressions of hubris regarding using their military might to intimidate neighbor countries. The existence of such museums addresses the problems of unequal access to and participation in knowledge practices, vitiated testimony, and hermeneutical marginalization mentioned by Miranda Fricker, Jose Medina and others, and is part of the solution to redressing wrongs and correcting the behavior of nations toward each other.

## Q

### **Aura Qiu: Dual Perspectives on Moral Dilemmas: Agency, Oppression, and Systemic Solutions**

In this paper, I examine the intersection of moral agency and oppressive systems through a dual-perspective framework that builds upon Lisa Tessman's concept of moral dilemmas. For Tessman, moral dilemmas arise when agents face conflicting moral requirements that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled, often involving non-negotiable values where violation results in unavoidable moral failure (Tessman 2010).

I argue that understanding moral dilemmas under conditions of oppression requires both a first-person perspective that captures the lived experience of agents facing impossible choices and a third-person perspective that analyzes the systemic constraints shaping these dilemmas. Through analyzing a concrete scenario adapted from Serena Khader's work on adaptive preferences, I demonstrate how this dual perspective reveals the interplay between personal moral terrain and structural support available to the agent.

Drawing on Sally Haslanger's analysis of social structures (Haslanger 2023) and Diana Meyers' work on agency under oppression (Meyers 2016), I investigate the role of moral autonomy in navigating ethical dilemmas arising from both individual circumstances and broader societal structures. While some moral dilemmas represent truly tragic and irrectifiable situations as Tessman suggests, I argue that many moral failures traditionally viewed as inevitable can be mitigated through systemic intervention and public support.

This framework contributes to ongoing conversations about the relationship between ethics and political philosophy in non-ideal conditions. By distinguishing between a first-

person perspective and a third-person perspective, the framework offers a more nuanced understanding of moral agency in an unjust world.

## R

### **Mohammad Rubaiyat Rahman: Immigration Enforcement Discrimination in Time of Uncertainty and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: Requiem por la Justicia Procesal**

The paper develops philosophical accounts which are centered around immigration enforcement discrimination, detention and procedural justice. It propounds two arguments. The first argument contends that immigration enforcement of the United States should be qualified by procedural justice and constitutional democracy. The second argument is that plenary power doctrine regarding immigration enforcement proceeding is exercised in unjustifiable manner as for immigration enforcement and detention.

For scaffolding the arguments, the paper philosophically illustrates issues of invidious indirect immigration discrimination (Mendoza 2017; Mendoza 2014)); why procedural justice matters (Barak 2023; Markenson 2015); how the absence of procedural justice blurs boundary between immigration enforcement and criminal law enforcement (Chacon 2010); and how plenary power doctrine is incompatible in constitutional democracy (Mendoza 2017; Mendoza 2020; Chang 2021; Motomura 1990, Motomura 1996; Augustine-Adams 2005).

In the United States, the immigration issues are mostly adjudicated by the administrative courts. In addition, the courts' decisions on immigration cases and local state legislatures' aggressive senate bills, e.g., Texas Senate Bill 4 and proposition 314 of Arizona, can convert law as vehicle of crimmigration (Stumpf 2006; Chacon 2010; Mendoza 2014) and oppression (Reed-Sandoval 2016).

The paper prioritizes its appraisal regarding practices of the U.S. immigration policy and enforcement in the US-Mexico borderlands, with concentration towards undocumented non-citizens and Latino citizens in the borderlands.

This contributes two significance to immigration enforcement discrimination research. Firstly, the paper's focus on the US-Mexico border is significant since the southern border of the United States (U.S.) has been declared a national emergency through an executive order issued in January of 2025. Secondly, focusing on the border enforcement regime adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico borderlands (Heyman 2009; Heyman 2022; Reed-Sandoval 2019) is pivotal to tap injustice in immigration enforcement. Furthermore, it would churn out from the discussion that immigration enforcement discrimination inflicts injustice non-only the undocumented non-citizens, but also the legal residents and citizens of the United States.

## **Gisela Reyes: Deep Coalitions and Resisting Forms of Co-optation**

In 2025, organizing against oppression within the United States is as complex and imperative a struggle as ever. As we parse through our toolbox for resistance we must assimilate a reality which many have tried to awaken us to; the advent of identity politics in mainstream culture has not been merely a triumph of the marginalized over the logics which render them invisible. Rather identity politics has suffered elite capture, as Olúfémi O. Táíwò argues in his latest book. The resistance tool - identity politics - which was once popularized by the Combahee River Collective to promote solidarity and organizing around the political priorities and agendas arising from the lived experiences of Black women who comprised the collective has since become a tool for justifying tensions and divisive rhetoric amongst social groups. As we embark on this arduous journey of resistance, we must find political tools which are best positioned to evade elite capture. I argue that my account of deep coalitional politics is one of the tools that we need for resistance given its ability to evade co-optation. To that end, I first draw on Táíwò's work on elite capture and constructive politics to promote a co-extensive use of deep coalitional politics and constructive politics which together I hold can evade elite capture and make meaningful strides against injustice. Second, I engage with Emmalon Davis's notion of epistemic appropriation to show how deep coalitions are specially equipped to evade the elite capture which ensues when epistemic appropriation is resisted.

## **Walter Riker: Political Meritocracy and the Democratic Peace**

I will examine contemporary models of political meritocracy in light of causal accounts of the democratic peace.

Tongdong Bai (*Against Political Equality*) has proposed a bicameral political meritocracy, in which a house of the people contains democratically elected representatives and a house of merit contains experts selected through some non-democratic process, such as an exam system. In contrast to this "horizontal" model, Bell (*The China Model*) has proposed a "vertical" one: democracy at the local level, and non-democratic meritocracy at the national level. Is either of these models consistent with the democratic peace thesis?

The democratic peace thesis holds that war is significantly less common between two democracies than it is between democracies and non-democracies or between two non-democracies. On this account, world peace would largely be realized in a global community of democracies. (Another interpretation holds that democracies are simply less militarily aggressive than other types of societies.)

While democratic peace theorists agree on the existence of the peace, they disagree on its cause. Some causal accounts (e.g., Aron; Rawls) focus on domestic satisfaction in

(liberal) democratic societies. Reelection constraint accounts (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita; Ray) focus instead on the negative political consequences failed wars have for elected representatives. And normative accounts (e.g., Chan; Maoz and Russett) focus on shared cultural and normative features of democracies as the cause of the democratic peace.

Though Bai's and Bell's models of political meritocracy involve democratic institutions and practices, it is not clear that either is a good fit for the democratic peace in terms of the causal accounts sketched above, satisfaction, reelection, and shared cultural/normative features. After examining this claim, I will offer some initial conclusions on whether the inclusion of political meritocracies in the global community would be a source of friction and war.

### **Jordy Rocheleau: From Refugee Rights to an International Duty of Resettlement: a Response to Liberal Exclusionism**

Proponents of human rights generally accept that migrants fleeing credible threats to life or liberty have a right to refuge. It would seem to be a corollary of this that any state which is capable has an obligation to resettle some of the 43 million refugees worldwide. However, even many theorists who recognize refugee rights have taken pains to argue that no particular state has duties to resettle them. Rather, they argue, states can discharge their duties so long as they facilitate the finding of a decent situation for refugees elsewhere.

This argument allows David Miller and Kit Wellman to defend nationalist state discretion over borders while retaining their bonafides as rights-upholding liberals. Even human rights theorist Gillian Brock adopts it to make her cosmopolitanism less demanding. Brock draws on Alexander Betts' and Paul Collier's argument that the most rational policy for the wealthy global North is to support improvement of the plight of refugees in camps in third world states, while refusing to accept refugees into their own countries.

This paper rejects this "liberal exclusionism" and argues that states which have the resources to accept refugees are obligated to do so. I first note that if refugee human rights are to be upheld, they must receive refuge somewhere, such that refusal to admit is not universalizable. The domestic analogy would be to a person who vows not to help any neighbor in need but offers to support others who do so. The effort to distance oneself from those in need is a failure of virtue. Moreover, the states currently hosting the majority of refugees are strained and frequently fail to provide decent conditions. Refugee-acceptance by wealthy states partially alleviates this strain. Any adoption of burden-shifting policies encourages similar buck passing elsewhere. While there is wisdom in proposals to improve the situations of refugees where they are, for the foreseeable future camps are apt to continue to fail to protect refugee rights. While liberal exclusionists call for locating adequate alternative refuge, their caveat is unlikely

to be realized in practice. In fact, the defense of a right to exclude by political philosophers is apt to be taken to support nationalist and nativist policies, while they ignore the cosmopolitan duties correlative to closed borders.

The obligation to receive refugees is magnified by specific duties that many, if not all, wealthy states have acquired, through responsibility for refugees' plight or entanglement by encountering them abroad, at one's borders, or in one's country, as Joseph Carens and others argue. Such situations give specificity to what could otherwise be understood as an imperfect duty to help some of those in need.

I reject Betts' and Colliers' pragmatic arguments from the dangers of giving hope for first world relocation and the unfairness of accepting a fraction of those in need. My argument is compatible with practical limits on refugee acceptance. However, to refuse to admit refugees in advance of necessity is unjustified.

### **Alberto Bejarano Romo: Desplazar y castigar: hacia una genealogía de la migración forzada en la frontera entre Estados Unidos y México (Displace and Punish: Toward a Genealogy of Forced Migration at the US-Mexico Border)**

This essay is part of a critical genealogy of migration at the US-Mexico border. In it, I analyze documents in the historical archive of the New Spanish province of Nueva Vizcaya (a region that encompassed parts of present-day Texas, New Mexico, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Durango) to establish historical connections between the creation of spaces of indigenous control during colonial times and the production and management of spaces of displacement and deportation that characterize the so-called migration crisis at the US-Mexican border today.

I identify techniques of government that are part of a colonial legacy of migratory control, including: 1) the emergence of institutions of forced labor grounded on capture (e.g. through presidios, military fortresses) and enslavement (encomiendas, repartimientos, and haciendas) and their correlate architectures, practices, norms, laws, administrative measures, and discourses; relatedly 2) the use and regulation of debt within these spaces of forced labor; 3) forced migrations [fn1], deportations, and 'denaturalizations' (desnaturalizaciones, a form of displacement) often carried out in 4) cuerdas or colleras (i.e. groups of captured people tied with ropes or shackled in rows); 5) correrías (raids) [fn2]; and 6) the classification and reclassification of racialized people based on their institution of forced labor (as opposed to their cultural identity or "place of origin"). By identifying these practices as part of a broader apparatus that produces, regulates, and eliminates racialized people, I hope to highlight some the ways that these practices relate to and overlap with each other in strategic moments for colonial purposes centered on the administration of movement.

Accordingly, the critical genealogy I propose points to the colonial legacies of current techniques or practices of government concerned with migration, a fact that demands a reformulation of the debates about the ethics and politics of migration prevalent in

contemporary, western philosophical discourse. This genealogical approach is intended to reorient our attention away from a focus on the right to exclude and the obligations liberal states might or might not have toward migrants, and toward questions pertaining to historical social justice and colonial reparations. My view is that as long as the histories of policing that sustain the colonial practices of forced migrations, displacements, and deportations are left out of philosophical debates, and as long as we do not examine the intersections of the current "migration crisis" and colonialism, philosophy will continue to approach migration from a very limited and often inadequate perspective. fn1: As early as 1729, colonial administrators refer explicitly to the act of displacement as "deportations." In the mid-1700s, Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, governor of Coahuila, proposes what he views as a definitive solution to the "Apache incursions": deporting all rebel Indians to the Antilles." Quoted in Mónica Samantha Amezcua García, "Deportación de una collera de Apaches en la Provincia de Coahuila," 38. fn 2:Cf. William L. Merrill "La economía política de las correrías: Nueva Vizcaya al final de la época colonial," 627.

### **Trenity Rosenberg: Living in Nepantla**

According to Gloria Anzaldúa, in *Light in the Dark/Luz en lo oscuro*, nepantla is the state of struggle, a place where personal and cultural codes can clash and collide. It is a point of contact and place between worlds, an in-between space of the material and immaterial – lugar no-lugar. For Anzaldúa, nepantla is where we seek harmony from our clashing realities, where we learn to integrate our multiple perspectives. Here we are pulling apart and putting ourselves back together again, or as she calls it the "Coyolxauhqui imperative." Anzaldúa does note that we cannot stay too long in nepantla because if we do it can halt our self-redefinition. But what if we could live in nepantla forever? Is there a way to redefine ourselves to exist in nepantla without halting our transformation? Can nepantla be used to engage with the dominant (western) reality without succumbing to it?

To answer these questions, I propose the use of affective thought/feeling and the use of rhythmic knowledge that is used by Indigenous peoples as described by Rodolfo Kusch in his book, *Indigenous and Popular Thinking in América*. Affective thought/feeling and rhythmic knowledge are where emotion drives one's reality, where there is an emphasis on remembering and seeing events as happenings. Kusch describes these modes of thinking and knowledge to be distinct from Western knowledge as it is not focused on objects, science, or through solutions.

I propose that if one can affectively think/feel and implement rhythmic knowledge, we in turn can live in nepantla. Through this mode of thinking/feeling and knowledge, we would not need to leave nepantla, as we are engaging with an in-between mode of thinking. Affective thinking/feeling and rhythmic knowledge emphasize the tensions of oneself, emphasize growth and commitment to ritual that can be tied to the "Coyolxauhqui imperative." It is here that I believe if we apply

Kusch's analysis to Anzaldúa's work we can transform nepantla into a space where one can exist in forever and engage with dominant realities through nepantla.

### **Ariel Rozinov: Distributive (In)justice as an Emergent Feature of Civility**

Sometimes we ignore what others tell us or interrupt them when they try to speak. Though normally we are civil: we listen attentively to others and wait for our own turn to talk. Through our behaviour, we communicate to our interlocutors that we respect them and are willing to consider what they have to say. For Calhoun (2000) civility is a political virtue. In pluralistic societies, people hold different values and thus enter into disagreements. Civility norms regulate dialogue by requiring individuals to avoid behaviour that might cause others to abandon the conversation. In this way, civility allows members of different groups to reach compromises.

However, as others (Young 2000; Sarat 2012) have pointed out, civility can and often does serve oppressive ends. Civility norms may demand members of oppressed groups to comply with and avoid resisting unjust practices. Being civil may involve "staying quiet". Such is the case with Martin Luther King Jr., whose advocacy made him uncivil in the eyes of the White public.

Keeping in mind that actual practices can fail to meet the ideal of civility, I focus on the effort individuals must expend in order to appear civil (i.e. to successfully communicate respect). As I show, civility not only consists of a collection of norms that dictate behaviour, but also includes a distribution of burdens. I argue that these burdens are not merely a cost to be paid to secure civil relations, instead these burdens may constitute a form of distributive injustice. Injustice occurs when civility's burdens disproportionately affect members of vulnerable groups who must take greater pains to be civil. An otherwise acceptable norm may impose unacceptable burdens. For example, civility may require us to suppress our anger and remain calm when faced with disagreement. However, anger is an appropriate reaction to injustice (Srinivasan 2018). Therefore, victims of injustice have greater difficulty complying with this norm.

For civility to fulfill its role as a public virtue, accessible to all, burdens must be distributed in an egalitarian manner. I consider several strategies for accomplishing this. One strategy involves the application of civility norms which impose different requirements on members of different groups.

## **S**

### **Ana Gabriela Sanchez: The Price of Exclusion: How Narcoculture Reshapes Moral Identity**

Born from the intersection of exclusion and the pursuit of power, narcoculture has become a dominant moral framework in marginalized Mexican communities. More than

a mere rejection of institutional norms, it is a resignification of values in a society where justice has historically been inaccessible. In the absence of legitimate recognition, it offers an alternative path to self-affirmation. Thus, narcoculture is not simply a byproduct of drug trafficking but a structural response to exclusion, in which arbitrary power becomes the primary means of social recognition.

From Rawls's ideal theory, this paper explores how narcoculture corrupts moral development by emerging in environments where primary goods, especially self-respect, are not guaranteed. In other words, if morality is acquired within a just environment, what happens when institutions neglect to provide the necessary conditions for its development? When a society fails to provide these essential goods, individuals seek not only material security but also recognition and acceptance in structures that reward power instead of cooperation. In doing so, they reinforce invisible social borders that, in turn, perpetuate cycles of violence and exclusion.

In this context, Mexican moral identity is shaped by the tension between marginalization and the pursuit of recognition. The absence of a shared sense of justice further fractures the moral framework within these communities, allowing narcoculture to emerge as an alternative. Narcoculture, therefore, does not represent a 'loss of values' but rather a corrupted moral identity born from exclusion and institutional abandonment—a moral void that reshapes collective identity. It is not enough to condemn narcoculture; we must restore moral pathways toward dignity and social recognition before violence, shaped by a distorted sense of self-respect, becomes the only way to attain them.

**Grecia Sanchez: Filosofía sin fronteras: repensando los límites de la divulgación filosófica y su impacto en la academia y la sociedad (Philosophy Without Borders: Rethinking the Limits of Philosophical Outreach and Its Impact on Academia and Society)**

Remembering the famous words of multi-award-winning border artist Juan Gabriel, my work highlights the epistemic contributions of border thinkers, philosophers, and artists to contemporary philosophical discourse on identity, hybridity, and resistance.

In his song *La Frontera*, Juan Gabriel famously declares, “a mí me gusta más estar en la frontera,” a sentiment that encapsulates the rich, generative nature of border spaces. Building on this idea, I argue that border cultures offer unique epistemic contributions that challenge dominant philosophical understandings of identity, hybridity, and resistance. This way, Juan Gabriel's words—“a mí me gusta más estar en la frontera” (“I like to be at the border the most”)—can be reimagined to reflect the intellectual and philosophical richness of the border through the phrase “a mí me gusta más pensar en la frontera” (“I prefer thinking at the border”).

The U.S.-Mexico border, particularly the region of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, serves as a site of complex epistemological dynamics. Lived experiences at the border reveal how identity is constantly negotiated through linguistic, cultural, and political hybridity. Scholars such as Gloria Anzaldúa, Walter Dignolo, and María Lugones have demonstrated how border epistemologies disrupt hegemonic knowledge production by offering alternative frameworks for understanding subjectivity, resistance, and decoloniality. In this sense, the border is not merely a geographical boundary but a dynamic epistemic space where multiple worldviews converge, challenging traditional philosophical paradigms.

To explore these epistemic contributions, my research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from border epistemology, applied ethics, decolonial thought, and case studies rooted in lived experiences from the U.S.-Mexico border. I engage with Anzaldúa's concept of mestiza consciousness, Homi Bhabha's analysis of cultural hybridity in postcolonial contexts, María Lugones' decolonial feminism, and Enrique Dussel's ethics of liberation, among others. By bringing these perspectives into conversation, I aim to illustrate how border cultures not only resist epistemic marginalization but also actively reshape philosophical discourse on identity, hybridity, and resistance.

**Lynda Avendaño Santana: Fundamentos críticos desde el arte online humanista y decolonial sobre el control y distribución de la información producida por la IA y las nuevas tecnologías (Critical Foundations from Humanist and Decolonial Online Art on the Control and Distribution of Information Produced by AI and New Technologies)**

Actualmente nos encontramos en un cambio de mundo, donde se ponen en escena el poder de algunas superpotencias como USA y China en la producción, el control y distribución de la información producida por la Inteligencia artificial-IA, que se expresan popular y respectivamente en el Chatgpt y en DeepSeek.

Para el común de la gente la Inteligencia artificial-IA es algo reciente, pero ya hacia 1962 USA experimentaba con IA para identificar rostros de personas en su programa de seguridad nacional. Desde entonces y ya antes cuando se inventaron los primeros softwares hacia fines de los años 40, el arte ha sido un espacio crítico respecto a las nuevas tecnologías, dando cuentas de sus ventajas y desventajas, siempre desde una mirada libre y humanista.

Esta intervención se centra sobre todo en el territorio de las expresiones visuales y artística online con perfil humanista que se han desarrollado desde fines de los `90 hasta hoy, promoviendo un espacio sin fronteras, como se aprecia por ejemplo, a nivel latinoamericano donde se ha dado relevancia a la circulación libre del conocimiento visual libre online, marcado por su carácter de procomún, de decolonial y de cultura libre.

El objetivo de esta presentación es dar cuenta de la cultura visual online que circula en la web, expresada en las visualidades contemporáneas concentradas actualmente en bancos de imágenes como CC Search, atendiendo a experiencias como las del net.art que ha sido la fuente experimental más puntera del arte online con artistas como el uruguayo Brian Mackern cuya obra está marcada por su dejo decolonial. En esta misma línea nos centraremos en los trabajos de la Critical AI, que pone en jaque las estrategias deshumanizadoras de la IA, como se aprecia en la obra decolonial, y ecológica de la artista chilena Yto Aranda.

Este estudio se realiza en un contexto en el que, como he mostrado en mis investigaciones anteriores, particularmente en Arte y Copyright. Del Arte moderno al arte Post-Internet (Avendaño, 2020), el capitalismo cognitivo que, como manifiesta Carlo Vercellone, "designa el desarrollo de una economía basada en la difusión del saber y en la que la producción del conocimiento pasa a ser la principal apuesta de la valorización del capital" (Vercellone, 2004: 66), ha posibilitado un mundo donde en verdad no interesa que el conocimiento libre y humanista como el de los net.artistas decoloniales, por ejemplo, circule libremente en la web, más bien promueve que empresas líderes como las empresas de USA creadoras del Chatgpt utilicen sin reconocer y pagar derechos de autor de millones de imágenes colocadas en repositorios de imágenes libres (Thompson, N. 03 de octubre de 2023).

Ante ello, artistas decoloniales se oponen a un capitalismo cognitivo que promueve una cultura capitalista y neocolonizadora (Faustino & Lippol, 2019). Cabe señalar, como lo dijo Enrique Dussel, que el capitalismo puede llevar a la destrucción del planeta.

#### English translation:

We are currently experiencing a world in transition, where the power of global superpowers such as the USA and China is displayed in the production, control, and distribution of information generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI)—popularly represented by ChatGPT and DeepSeek, respectively.

For the general public, AI may seem like a recent development, but as early as 1962, the USA was already experimenting with AI to recognize human faces as part of its national security programs. Even earlier, with the invention of the first software programs in the late 1940s, art has served as a critical space for engaging with new technologies, highlighting both their advantages and drawbacks from a free and humanistic perspective.

This presentation focuses primarily on the territory of visual and artistic expressions online with a humanistic orientation, which have been developing since the late 1990s. These practices have promoted borderless digital spaces, such as those seen in Latin America, where emphasis has been placed on the free circulation of visual knowledge online, characterized by its commons-based, decolonial, and free culture ethos.

The goal of this talk is to examine the visual online culture circulating on the web, as expressed in contemporary visualities, currently found in image repositories such as CC Search. Particular attention is paid to net.art, the most experimental branch of online art, and artists such as Uruguayan Brian Mackern, whose work is marked by a decolonial sensibility. In this same line, we highlight the work of Critical AI, which challenges the dehumanizing strategies of artificial intelligence, as seen in the decolonial and ecological art of Chilean artist Yto Aranda.

This study is developed in a context that, as demonstrated in my previous research—particularly in *Art and Copyright. From Modern Art to Post-Internet Art* (Avendaño, 2020)—reflects the rise of cognitive capitalism. As Carlo Vercellone puts it, cognitive capitalism “refers to the development of an economy based on the diffusion of knowledge, where knowledge production becomes the central focus of capital valorization” (Vercellone, 2004: 66). This has enabled a world in which free and humanistic knowledge, such as that of decolonial net.artists, is not encouraged to circulate openly on the web. Instead, leading companies—like the American creators of ChatGPT—have been known to use millions of images from open-access repositories without recognition or copyright compensation (Thompson, N. October 3, 2023).

In response, decolonial artists oppose a form of cognitive capitalism that fosters a capitalist and neocolonial culture (Faustino & Lippol, 2019). As Enrique Dussel warned, capitalism may ultimately lead to the destruction of the planet.

### **Gaia Sirchia: Building Bridges in a Polarized World: The Legacy of Gloria Anzaldúa**

This paper delves into the border onto-epistemology of Gloria Evangelina Anzaldúa, presenting her work as a vital intellectual response to the complexities of our time. Anzaldúa’s writings offer a radical counter-narrative to what is described as a “global war regime” (Mezzadra and Hardt, 2024), a pervasive condition of contemporary life marked by oppressions and capitalistic exploitation. Through the lens of Anzaldúa’s border onto-epistemology, this paper examines how her ideas challenge contemporary polarization - manifested in both cultural and armed wars - and propose alternative modes of subjectivity's production rooted in the intersections of multiple identities. Central to this exploration is the “bridge methodology” (Carrillo Rowe, 2008) that Anzaldúa employs to create spaces of transformation amidst opposition (Keating, 2012). By revisiting Anzaldúa’s work in the Gloria Evangelina Anzaldúa Papers at the Benson Collection at UT Austin, this study suggests that her onto-epistemological framework provides crucial insights into how we might navigate today’s fractured world, one that is both shaped by injustices and by the ongoing struggles for justice and equality. Anzaldúa’s vision of the border as a site of transformation and possibility offers not only a critique of existing power structures but also a call to reimagine forms of coalition capable of fostering social change.

## **Eli Springer: Migrations and Transitions: What's at Stake in Protecting Them**

The closure of borders inflicts harm not only on individuals, but also on our collective epistemic life. Epistemic "locations" or "standpoints" generate little insight so long as we remain static: Dynamic changes in location are essential to understanding (Gibson 1979). Indeed, migrants are the "OG" models for what Maria Lugones (1990) calls "world-traveling". Migration generates potent and ever-shifting encounters, prompting the building of epistemic pathways, translations, bridges (Anzaldúa 1987, Ortega 2016).

Today, both geographical migration and gender transition are under political attack. I take these moves to be related not only in their political motives, but also in their epistemic "chilling effects". At least in the case of geographical border-closing, the epistemic damage should be clear: to limit geographical migration is to limit the paths of encounter that foster social understanding.

Does the "closing of the gender border" endanger our collective epistemic capacities in a similar way? There are at least three reasons to pause over whether transgender "migration" matters to our collective understanding in the way that geographical migration clearly does. I will reckon with these complexities before turning to a more positive account.

Trans\* narratives may be pressured (Spade 2006) to claim a static gender identity, implying that "transition" steps (access to hormones, surgeries, updated documents, etc.) simply affirm an inner gender that has not changed. Meanwhile, the discourse of "dead-naming" suggests radical dissociation from gendered aspects of pre-transition existence. Further, when advocates of gender-affirming health care frame their work as suicide prevention, they add ballast to the portrayal of trans youth as only ever precariously and liminally alive prior to transitional care. With all these associations in play, the idea of gender "migrants" — as people who have lived in one gender "location" before coming to live fully in another — falls short.

There's a third doubt: Perhaps gender transition cannot have the epistemic significance of geographical migration. After all, geographical migrations bring people into contact with others whose culture, language, and relations to land would otherwise remain unfamiliar. Contact across gender difference is apparently pervasive, though. Surely gender transition cannot have such an essential role in building epistemic bridges, then?

I bridge this apparent difference from both directions — noticing ways in which geographical migration parallels gender transition than previously appreciated, and affirming the possibility of gender migration that traces out new pathways of social understanding.

Emerging trans\* narratives and theories (Snorton, Gessen, Heyam, Zurn et al) show how gender transition fosters new epistemic connections, not only within the private

experience of transitioners, but in our broader world of social knowledge. Gender transition experiences can be interpreted not as ontological category change, but as continuous movement, or transit, through something analogous to borderlands (Anzaldua). Borderlands are themselves powerful places to become familiar with, such that there are distinct forms of learning made possible through such movement. If we welcome gender migrants, we will gain fresh glimpses of our shared world. (Medina, Scheman)

What is at stake in protecting migrations and transitions is personal and political, but also epistemic.

### **Ronald R. Sundstrom: The Dread of Tyrants: Frederick Douglass on Dignity and the Liberty of Thought and Expression**

Frederick Douglass (c. 1818–1895), an American former slave, abolitionist leader, and icon, justified the liberties of thought and expression, encompassing opinion, literacy, and speech. His defense of freedom of thought and expression was directly connected to his principal mission to declaim and argue against slavery and the subjugation of Black Americans. The struggle for these liberties was at the core of his narrative of personal development and the blossoming of self-respect and drove his commitment to moral suasion in the abolitionist cause and the realization of equal citizenship for all. His justification of these liberties and the ultimate purpose he believed they served is a valuable contribution to classic nineteenth-century moral and political theories of freedom. I explain his view of the liberties of thought and expression by appealing to key speeches and scenes from his autobiographical writings. However, beyond the importance and detail of his argument lies the value of what grounds them. I contend that Douglass based those liberties on a view of human dignity that is irreducibly moral and existential, which should, in turn, form and guide those liberties in a democratic, egalitarian, and, ultimately, cosmopolitan direction. Additionally, I challenge what I believe to be a misinterpretation of Douglass's account of liberty and dignity, which associates them too closely with power, thereby obscuring their moral and existential foundations.

**T**

### **Merve R. Tapınç: Ideology Critique and the Duty to Share What You Know**

Individuals are influenced by social norms and group beliefs that promote certain actions as good, even when they may be oppressive. If social groups and norms render a common practice as the right way of caring for one another, it might be too much to expect an individual to identify what is problematic, oppressive, or wrong, especially when their community leaves them unable to interpret the right action correctly. I discuss whether ideology critique can offer a viable solution to this epistemic problem. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that we unconsciously operate through

ideology and oppressive practices without recognizing the wrongness of certain actions. As many scholars in the ideology literature have emphasized, social norms and practices are not merely “ideas in the head,” but are embedded in social behaviors and practices (Haslanger, 2018; Kukla, 2018, 2018; Swanson, 2015). This poses an epistemic problem for agents: if these beliefs are too implicit and embedded in social practices, agents might not even know which step in their reasoning is misleading or where they should start questioning. In the part 2, I will consider a common potential objection which states that if agents are aware of disagreements and objections to their views, they should question and revise their beliefs. To respond to this objection, I will discuss how identity-preserving mechanisms, and group belonging guide us not only on how to think about what needs to be considered but also on which considerations should carry weight. Since the issue is under what conditions we can assess an agent’s blameworthiness, in part 3, I will also consider whether education through ideology critique can help agents question their beliefs and understand what is morally right. While this might help agents’ epistemic progress in recognizing the right action, I will conclude that it is not always a reliable solution without the social support needed to develop the moral skill to respond to wrongdoing.

## **V**

### **Becky Vartabedian: Hesitation and the Time of Hospitality**

In this paper, I argue that hesitation is the proper time of hospitality, evidenced in an assessment of the encounter with a stranger. Whether the stranger is treated as a threat or revered as a god in disguise, this determination prescribes a temporal interval in which a would-be host discerns both the intentions of the stranger and whether to welcome or reject the visitor. An examination of this interval reveals a moment of hesitation between the perception of a stranger and the choice of how that stranger will be treated.

Alia Al-Saji’s accounts of hesitation and Elizabeth Freeman’s concept of the anachronism ground my argument. Both hesitation and anachronism are developed from marginalized positions, and as such reveal important and deeply problematic features of dominant temporal assumptions, especially in the way these assumptions organize encounters with the stranger. I suggest that these dominant temporal assumptions, forged from resources of colonialism and heteronormativity, are abrogations of the appropriate time of hospitality, having effectively “jumped” or elided the interval of hesitation the hospitality encounter prescribes. I conclude by explaining the way these abrogations confirm valences of Jacques Derrida’s provocative claim that “We do not know what hospitality is.”

### **Eduardo Ismael Reyes Vasquez: Cultura y naturaleza en los pueblos rarámuri: traducción intercultural ante la determinación de las ficciones**

## **occidentales (Culture and Nature in the Rarámuri Peoples: Intercultural Translation in the Face of Western Fictions)**

Las perspectivas occidentales han ejercido históricamente violencia epistémica a sujetos marginados sistémicamente por los circuitos hegemónicos en curso. En el caso de los pueblos originarios, como los rarámuri, no es la excepción, ya que sus particulares concepciones de mundo suelen ser diferentes a las convenciones sociales y no se adaptan completamente a las dinámicas y modelos impuestos por los estratos de poder. Si bien, han logrado sostenerse relativamente en la sociedad, han tenido que aceptar, asimilar y resignificar las ficciones occidentales (como la cultura, la naturaleza o incluso la religión) para su supervivencia. Sin embargo, constantemente son rechazados, desplazados y discriminados en sus intentos por usar el espacio público, comercios, transporte y hasta para recibir una educación básica digna. No se les brindan las mismas oportunidades laborales, de vivienda y educativas.

Las categorías, cultura y naturaleza, como ficciones occidentales, han creado un complejo tramado en el que el rarámuri es determinado sin la posibilidad de construirse a sí mismo ante la mirada del otro. El problema yace en que estas categorías, bajo estos términos, no se adaptan a la realidad rarámuri, lo que provoca puntos de inflexión entre sus perspectivas que derivan en una subordinación de sus concepciones de mundo ante las formas hegemónicas. Entonces, para que haya justicia social, debemos partir de un abordaje ético y hasta estético, lo que implica la necesidad de revalorizar sus saberes e incorporarlos a un corpus de conocimiento pluriversal de forma digna y justa ante los modelos de legitimación y valoración de los estratos hegemónicos. Es así como la noción de 'traducción intercultural', de las epistemologías del sur, cobra sentido como una herramienta conceptual que permite reflexionar a través de las diferentes perspectivas para entablar diálogos sin preferencias ni subordinación de una cultura a otra.

Un ejemplo de cómo se pueden integrar sus saberes en un corpus pluriversal está en su noción de naturaleza. Los rarámuri suelen atribuirle dignidad y subjetividades a los animales, plantas y espacios naturales; se relacionan con profundo respeto hacia la naturaleza. Caso contrario con los grupos humanos regidos por perspectivas occidentales, ya que la ven como un recurso al servicio de las sociedades basadas en el consumo material. En ese sentido, si se incorporan las nociones rarámuri en el conocimiento pluriversal, podríamos provocar beneficios mutuos derivados de una relación positiva con la naturaleza, en vistas hacia su conservación y, por ende, también la de los seres humanos.

### English translation:

Western perspectives have historically exercised epistemic violence against subjects who are systematically marginalized by ongoing hegemonic structures. Indigenous peoples, such as the Rarámuri, are no exception, as their particular worldviews often

differ from social conventions and do not fully align with the dynamics and models imposed by dominant power structures. While they have managed to sustain themselves within society to some degree, they have had to accept, assimilate, and reinterpret Western fictions (such as culture, nature, and even religion) for their survival. Nevertheless, they are constantly rejected, displaced, and discriminated against in their efforts to access public spaces, businesses, transportation, and even basic education. They are not provided with the same employment, housing, or educational opportunities.

The Western constructs of culture and nature, as fictions, have created a complex framework in which the Rarámuri are defined without the possibility of constructing their own identity in the eyes of others. The issue lies in the fact that these categories, as currently defined, do not adapt to the Rarámuri reality, creating points of tension between their perspectives and hegemonic forms of knowledge, which leads to the subordination of their worldview.

Therefore, achieving social justice requires an ethical—and even aesthetic—approach, which involves the need to revalue Indigenous knowledge systems and integrate them into a dignified and just pluriversal corpus of knowledge, challenging the models of legitimacy and validation imposed by hegemonic structures. In this sense, the notion of “intercultural translation”, from the epistemologies of the South, becomes a meaningful conceptual tool to foster dialogue among different perspectives without privileging or subordinating one culture over another.

One example of how Rarámuri knowledge can be integrated into a pluriversal corpus lies in their conception of nature. The Rarámuri attribute dignity and subjectivity to animals, plants, and natural spaces, engaging with nature in a deeply respectful way. In contrast, human groups governed by Western perspectives tend to see nature as a resource at the service of material consumption-based societies. Thus, by incorporating Rarámuri conceptions into a pluriversal knowledge system, we could foster mutual benefits stemming from a more positive relationship with nature—aimed at its preservation, and consequently, the preservation of human life as well.

### **Melisa Vivanco: Epis-Technological Bridges to Injustice**

Discussions on border technology often focus on excessive surveillance, overlooking injustices caused by the deliberate non-use of available tools. This work examines how the selective deployment and omission of digital systems at the U.S.-Mexico border exacerbate epistemic injustice, particularly hermeneutical injustice, by depriving migrants and asylum seekers of the interpretive resources needed to navigate opaque immigration procedures. While migrants expect a “smart border,” they encounter outdated infrastructure, inconsistent policies, and linguistic barriers that deepen their vulnerability. The strategic non-use of available technology—such as real-time translation, automated case tracking, and digital transparency mechanisms—widens

existing gaps in collective interpretive resources, leaving travelers unable to understand or contest life-altering decisions made about their migration status.

Through case studies such as the CBP One app and the Family Expedited Removal Management (FERM) program, I illustrate how both technological overreach and strategic neglect reinforce structural inequities. For instance, the CBP One app—intended to streamline asylum processing—creates additional barriers for migrants by requiring internet access, digital literacy, and English or Spanish proficiency, systematically excluding those most in need. Similarly, the FERM program accelerates deportation proceedings while withholding real-time interpretation services, effectively silencing Indigenous asylum seekers. These technological practices result in situated hermeneutical inequality (Fricker 2007), where migrants lack the conceptual and linguistic tools to make sense of their own experiences, leaving them vulnerable to bureaucratic and legal disenfranchisement.

This investigation examines the intersection of technology, migration, and epistemic injustice to highlight the ethical and political implications of migration management policies that prioritize deterrence over accessibility.. Addressing border injustices requires a reassessment of how technologies are (and are not) integrated into immigration processes, ensuring they do not perpetuate interpretive and testimonial inequalities.

**W**

### **Kelly Weirich and A.G. Holdier: Emotional Outsourcing**

Much of human relationship is built and sustained through the exchange of words. An apology, an encouraging text, a love letter, or a message of support can each serve as a vehicle for moral repair, affection, friendship, and validation. With the popular advent of generative AI, one can now enlist various computer systems to produce these expressions, thus avoiding the work of writing them oneself. Following [redacted] (2023), we call this activity emotional outsourcing: the giving over of a process paradigmatically expressive of emotions, such as personal writing, to another person or entity to complete on your behalf.

This paper offers an initial exploration of the typical features and moral dimensions of emotional outsourcing. By analyzing several illustrations of the phenomenon, we clarify why emotional outsourcing can, at least sometimes, be bad, wrong, or otherwise worth avoiding. Whether troubling cases are best explained in terms of harms, vices, or failed duties is not here our main concern. Rather, by identifying some of what is lost when emotional processes are outsourced, we aim to better articulate the value of relating to others in fruitful, if demanding, ways.

We begin by defining emotional outsourcing and delineating the scope of this project. The cases at the center of our attention are generative, communicative, affective, and selective. That is, they involve an agent tasking a generator to create an artifact (such as a written text), for the purpose of communicating an emotionally-laden message to a specific audience regarding a particular subject. Drawing on the work of Iris Murdoch, we argue that troubling cases of emotional outsourcing paradigmatically involve the agent engaging the generator without properly attending to the subject (or the audience) of the work. Consider a letter from a lover to their beloved: the act of love — what reifies and reaffirms their relationship — is not only the written words, but the process of writing those words. To give this process over to another entity or person who doesn't know, and can't attend to, the subject in the requisite way is to prevent that act of love from manifesting. We highlight two kinds of goods that are lost in such cases: the opportunity for authentic co-construction of our social identities (cf. Hilde Lindemann) and the personal goods that the agent could have gained by engaging directly in the emotional work.

Writing our own words matters, not just for epistemic or moral reasons (like avoiding deception or maintaining integrity), but because without personally engaging in these relational processes, we close ourselves off to the real, important work that occurs between us.

### **Amelia Wirts: The Structural Antagonism of Order Maintenance: An Argument for Un-bundling Police Functions**

Calls to “defund the police” proliferated during the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020. These calls can be understood as efforts to unbundle different functions that police are expected to perform to reduce police violence against certain minorities. One key function, public order maintenance, could be performed by a new institution, while police focus on enforcing criminal statutes. I make this case by showing what Joseph Heath gets right about order maintenance, that it requires enforcing disputed social norms. But Heath fails to appreciate the full implications of this feature of order maintenance when performed by police, a part of the criminal legal system, and the social meanings that criminal law carries with it.

Joseph Heath argues that police violence against minorities stems from the very structure of order maintenance, so any new order maintenance institution will produce the same problems. Order maintenance, Heath argues, always entails enforcing some set of hegemonic but not universal social norms. For example, legislatures empower police to maintain order through intentionally broad criminal statutes that police may use as tools to maintain order, such as prohibitions on disturbing the peace or causing a public nuisance. This discretion forces police to rely on respectability norms of the dominant culture to adjudicate disputes on the spot. So, order maintenance structurally disadvantages those from minority groups that follow different norms of ‘respectability.’ Inevitably, police are unfairly heavy-handed to minorities, e.g., interpreting the dress,

speech, or music of black teenagers as signs they are disturbing the peace. This heavy-handedness creates a vicious cycle where minority groups grow resentful of police, and police, in turn, resentful of them. This would be no different if a new institution performed this function.

Heath assumes that the argument for unbundling order maintenance from criminal statute enforcement is based on the idea that maintenance is less antagonistic than enforcing criminal statutes. Thus, he argues that unbundling won't help because order maintenance produces its own antagonism. A different reason to unbundle is that the social meanings of criminal statute enforcement should not be brought to the inherent antagonism of order maintenance. When police interact with individuals in an order-maintenance capacity, they bring the social meanings of criminal law with them. That is, when a police officer interacts with a rule-breaker, to both the police officer and the public, the line between the rule-breaker as merely disruptive to 'respectable' order and rule-breaker as criminal (threat, bad person, etc) is blurry. As Heath notes, structurally, those who perform public order maintenance will inevitably produce antagonistic relationships with those whose social norms are in conflict with status quo social norms. Unbundling would allow an institution not associated with criminality to perform similar functions without bringing the complicated set of social meanings of the criminal legal system into contact with the public in everyday order maintenance scenarios. Instead, the current bundling means that the inevitable treatment of minorities as threats to public order is ratcheted up to treatment as criminal.